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Abstract  
There has been a growing demand for spectrum availability due to inefficient management of the radio 
frequency spectrum and underutilization of all spectrum bands. Spectrum has been managed with the 
same approach for over the last decade and only recently due to the phenomenal growth in mobile and 
broadband communications has attention been given to it. Intelligent communication systems such as 
cognitive radio have been identified in assisting the need for the limited resource, wireless spectrum. If 
spectrum trading becomes commercially successful, it can provide great economic and social benefits 
for the service provider, primary and secondary users. In order to maintain viability of spectrum trading, 
a pricing strategy is necessary for secondary users, it is also imperative to find a game theory model that 
minimally impacts the primary users in terms of their service, however it should aid in decreasing the 
cost to the primary users. Game theory along with economic theory is used to analyse the 
relationships/cooperation between the users and service provider. This work contributes to the field of 
dynamic spectrum access and aims to compare pricing strategies of secondary users in terms of the 
revenue earned by the primary service providers as well as investigate the impact of regulations on said 
pricing strategies.  
 
The pricing strategies modelled and simulated in MATLAB include the market-equilibrium pricing 
strategy and the competitive pricing strategy. These two strategies are chosen as they are the most 
relevant in South Africa. The two pricing strategies are compared in terms of advantages and 
disadvantages as well the revenue earned by each of the primary services. The framework for testing is 
provided along with the test cases. The influence of telecommunication regulations and policy on the 
frameworks and results are discussed in detail as well as the impact of the telecommunication regulation 
and policy in South Africa.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Background to Spectrum Trading and Pricing in South Africa 
1.1 Introduction 
The radio frequency spectrum is natural resource critical for delivering electronic 
communication services and for building a knowledge-driven economy and society. With 
the growing demands for spectrum in the country and the poor assignment of spectrum 
bands, it is regarded as a scarce resource. “In the last decade, while bandwidth efficiency 
for high quality multimedia transmission over wireless networks has been dramatically 
improved in terms of speed, reliability and power level, the demand for wireless spectrum 
use has been growing as rapidly with the consequence that the wireless spectrum is 
becoming a scarce resource.”[1] In order to improve the utilization of the radio frequency 
spectrum, intelligent wireless communication systems such as cognitive radio 
technologies can be utilized.  
 
Studies have shown that while some frequency bands are heavily used there are many 
bands that are unoccupied most of the time, dependent on geographical areas and 
population. These potential unoccupied bands can be optimised by use by unlicensed 
users. Cognitive radios are able to improve the capability of a wireless receiver by 
allowing it to operate in multiple frequency bands using multiple transmission bands.  
 
In the past a number of research projects focused on the use of Cognitive Radio, as it was 
an emerging technology, currently there has been a drive to focus on the various pricing 
strategies for spectrum sharing between primary and secondary users. The sharing can be 
achieved by deployment of two specific themes, namely “Sensing and detection of 
Primary Radio signals in a Cognitive Radio Environment using modulation identification 
technology” and “Distributed Transmit Power control strategies for Cognitive Radio 
Networks: Challenges, Requirements and Options”. Prof Nel and Dr Zhu [1] have 
performed extensive work on pricing strategies pertaining to opportunistic spectrum 
access.   
 
To design efficient and effective dynamic spectrum access techniques for a cognitive 
radio network, technical aspects (such as power control and channel allocation) as well as 
economic aspects (such as pricing) need to be considered. Through spectrum trading, the 
licensed users (or primary service provider) are able to sell a portion of the unused 
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spectrum to the unlicensed users (or secondary service provider) for a price. Pricing for 
both the licensed users selling spectrum and the unlicensed users buying the spectrum is 
important. Therefore, an optimal and stable solution for spectrum trading in terms of price 
and allocated spectrum is required to maximise the revenue of the seller and utility of the 
buyer while still satisfying both the seller and buyer and their solutions. 
 
Game theory and Economic theory are used to analyse the relationships and interactions 
between the players (primary and secondary users). Game theory is “an important tool in 
studying, modelling and analysing the cognitive interaction process” [2] and provides a 
stepping-stone in analysing various pricing strategies for spectrum sharing. Concepts such 
as utility theory, market-equilibrium, oligopoly market and auction theory define the 
incentive for licensed users to yield the right of spectrum access to the unlicensed users. 
 
As radio spectrum is a major component of the infrastructure that enables the information 
society, an important issue in spectrum trading is policy, regulation and spectrum 
management. Spectrum regulations and policies define rules of cooperation between 
primary and secondary users and spectrum management has been practised around the 
world since the 1920’s. The use of spectrum is regulated by the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) and the management and 
development of the spectrum plays an important role in developing a knowledge-driven 
economy and society. The regulator directly impacts the pricing model used in the 
country by the regulations and policy it enforces.  
 
In South Africa, the spectrum management arrangements are a shared responsibility 
between the policy maker and the regulatory authority, i.e. the Department of 
Communication (DoC) coordinates spectrum for government services, while ICASA 
regulates all other spectrum requirements. Currently spectrum trading is seen as illegal 
and is being investigated by ICASA and the DoC.  
 
There is increasing interest in this technology from researchers in both academia and 
industry, and engineers in the wireless industry, as well as from spectrum policy makers. 
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1.2 Problem Definition 
Through spectrum trading, the licensed users (or primary service provider) are able to sell 
a portion of the unused spectrum to the unlicensed users (or secondary service provider). 
In spectrum trading, pricing for both the licensed users selling spectrum and the 
unlicensed users buying the spectrum is imperative, hence an optimal and stable solution 
for spectrum trading in terms of price and allocated spectrum is required to maximise the 
revenue of the seller and utility of the buyer while still satisfying both the seller and buyer 
and their solutions. This optimal and stable solution is dependent on the regulations and 
policies enforced in the country.  
 
A challenge for spectrum trading today would be for regulators and researchers alike in 
identifying an appropriate band to promote spectrum trading or to facilitate the entry of 
new market participants. 
1.3 Motivation  
With the exponential growth in wireless services and technologies, the demand for radio 
spectrum is steadily increasing. With the current spectrum management policy in which 
spectrum bands are assigned statically, there is the issue of crowded spectrum as well as 
underutilization of spectrum at various times and bands.  This raises concerns of 
regulatory authorities about the optimal pricing mechanisms for spectrum usage. 
 
This work is motivated by consideration of dynamic spectrum access from an economic 
perspective and can benefit the regulator in providing them with a perspective that 
considers both the regulatory issues as well as engineering concerns.  The development of 
the pricing strategy is closely related with resource allocation.  
1.4 Scope and Objectives 
The key objective of this research is to use scientific tools to evaluate and compare the 
two pricing strategies. In achieving this, the scope and objectives covers: 
a. Carry out a literature survey on the application of game theory, economic theory 
and pricing strategies in cognitive radio networks as well as the 
telecommunication regulations and policy in South Africa pertaining to spectrum 
trading; 
b. Make theoretical enquiry into the two strategies under review and establish 
deductions based on computer simulations; and 
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c. Provide an analysis of the spectrum trading regulatory approaches together with 
deductions based on the computer simulations; and 
d. Lay a theoretical foundation for further research. 
1.5 Research Question 
It has been proved that spectrum can be shared amongst users successfully. Is spectrum 
trading viable in South Africa? If so, which spectrum band is it most suited for? How 
does the regulations and policy impact spectrum trading and the selected band? 
 
Would the payoffs received from secondary user spectrum trading be worth charging for 
or is it acceptable for it to be offered for free? 
1.6 Organisation of this Research Report 
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction into the subject of spectrum sharing for cognitive radio 
networks and discusses the motivation and problem definition behind the research as well 
as the objectives of this research. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the cognitive radio environment, its components, cognitive radio 
applications and dynamic spectrum access. The cognition cycle is briefly explained along 
with its aspects, namely spectrum sensing, spectrum analysis and spectrum decision. An 
introduction is given to game theory and economic theories in dynamic spectrum access, 
which presents a method to model the relationship and interactions among primary and 
secondary users competing for spectrum and pricing strategies to assign the price.  
 
Chapter 3 extends the literature survey in Chapter Two to a review of specific application 
scenarios considered in some research papers. The literature review is from the 
perspective of contextual assessment of spectrum sharing, game theory and economic 
theory models applied in cognitive networks. The concluding section discusses 
telecommunication regulations with respect to spectrum trading and spectrum licensing, 
its usage and the importance of spectrum sharing in a South African context. 
 
Chapter 4 presents a framework for the two options of pricing strategies in cognitive 
radio networks which are under consideration, in sufficient theoretical detail. The 
approach is to define a simple scenario in which to apply the two strategies separately, 
given the same conditions and assumptions. This chapter also discusses the algorithms of 
the pricing strategies in a logical manner. 
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Chapter 5 presents the research methodology for both the framework depicted in Chapter 
4 and the analysis of spectrum trading regulations and policy followed by the simulation 
results and approaches to spectrum trading regulations. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the research findings, recommendations, future work and conclusion. 
1.7 Summary 
This chapter is an introduction to the subject of spectrum sharing for cognitive radio 
networks and discusses the motivation and problem definition behind the research. A 
summary on the organisation of the research report is presented. The following chapter 
provides background theory on spectrum trading concepts such as cognitive radio, TV 
white spaces, game theory, economic theory and spectrum trading and pricing.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Background Theory to Spectrum Trading Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the concept the three fundamental operational processes of the 
cognition cycle and dynamic spectrum sharing, namely spectrum sensing, spectrum 
analysis and spectrum decision and provides definitions on a Software-Defined radio and 
the cognitive cycle. Applications of cognitive radio are discussed with specific reference 
to spectrum sharing.  
 
The following sections deal with the introduction to game theory and economic theory, 
and the three pricing strategies, namely market-equilibrium pricing, competitive pricing 
and cooperative pricing, as solutions to the challenges of pricing strategies in cognitive 
networks. Spectrum pricing and spectrum trading is discussed in detail. 
 
2.2 Cognitive Radio Environment 
“Cognitive radio is an emerging technique to improve the utilization of radio frequency 
spectrum in wireless networks” and is able to advance the adaptability and flexibility of 
wireless communication systems as mentioned in [3] 
 
The concept of “cognitive radio” was first proposed by Mitola in 1999 which he defined 
as: “the point in which wireless personal digital assistants (PDAs) and the related 
networks are sufficiently computationally intelligent about radio resources and related 
computer-to-computer communications to: (a) detect user communications needs as a 
function of use context, and (b) to provide radio resources and wireless services most 
appropriate to those needs”. Recently the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
suggested that any radio with adaptive spectrum awareness is to be referred to as a 
cognitive radio. [21], [22] 
 
The motivation behind cognitive radios is the scarcity of the frequency spectrum which 
by exploiting the existence of spectrum holes, as they are aware of its surrounding 
environment, the efficiency of the frequency spectrum can be improved as discussed in 
[4] A spectrum hole is defined as the frequency band which is allocated to licenced users 
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and in some locations and in some times not utilised by the licensed users and could 
therefore be accessed by unlicensed users.  
 
Cognitive radios are able to perform dynamic spectrum management (also known as 
opportunistic spectrum access), as they are able to detect available channels at a specific 
time or location in the wireless spectrum and accordingly change its transmission or 
reception parameters to accommodate more wireless communications in a spectrum band. 
Dynamic spectrum sharing allows for efficient and fair spectrum allocation among 
primary users and secondary users.  
 
Secondary users are unlicensed wireless users that are equipped with cognitive radio 
devices that sense the spectrum they want to use and detect the presence of primary users, 
also known as legacy spectrum holders. Based on the information detected by the 
secondary users, they can now dynamically access the licensed bands based on negotiated 
or opportunistic basis with minimal interference on the primary users. Secondary users 
make use of a concept known as dynamic spectrum access or opportunistic spectrum 
access. Dynamic spectrum access exploits the fact that large portions of the spectrum are 
underutilized as bandwidth demands vary along space and time dimensions, also known 
as “white spectrum”.[1] The process of selling spectrum underutilised by primary users to 
secondary users is known as spectrum trading. 
 
The major factor that leads to underutilised spectrum is the inefficient use of the radio 
spectrum by the current spectrum licensing scheme. In the current spectrum licensing 
scheme, the radio spectrum allocated to licensed users cannot be used by unlicensed users 
while the spectrum allocated is not in use. This static and inflexible allocation of 
spectrum forces legacy wireless systems to be able to operate only on a dedicated 
spectrum band, unable to adapt the transmission band according to the changing 
environment.[27]  
 
An important characteristic of cognitive radios is its cognitive intelligence that allows the 
secondary user to perform intelligent decisions on spectrum usage and communication 
parameters based on the sensed spectrum dynamics as well as the primary users 
decisions.  The major functionalities of a cognitive radio include spectrum sensing, 
spectrum management/spectrum sharing and spectrum mobility and this is assisted by a 
Software Defined Radio (SDR), the key component to implementing cognitive radios. 
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Users access a wireless system through the air interface that is a common resource and 
they transmit information using battery energy. Since the air interface is a shared 
medium, each user’s transmission is a source of interference for others. The signal-to 
interference ratio (SIR) is a measure of the quality of signal reception for the wireless 
user. Typically, a user intends to achieve a high quality of reception (high SIR) while at 
the same time expending a small amount of energy. 
2.2.1 Software-Defined Radio (SDR) 
The wireless innovation forum defines a software defined radio as “a radio in which some 
or all of the physical layer functions are software defined” [28]. This means that channel 
modulation and waveforms are defined in software, allowing the SDR hardware to 
support any waveform at any carrier frequency and any bandwidth. Waveforms are 
generated as sampled digital signals, and converted from digital to analogue, similarly the 
receiver utilises a wideband analogue to digital converter to capture all the channels of 
the software node. 
 
A SDR allows for a reconfigurable wireless communication system in which the 
transmission parameters (operating frequency band, modulation mode, and protocol) can 
be controlled dynamically. The main functions of SDR include multiband operation 
(support of wireless data transmissions over different frequency spectrum used by 
different wireless access systems), multistandard support, multiservice support and 
multichannel support (operate (transmit and receive) over multiple frequency bands 
simultaneously). [27]  
2.2.2 Cognitive Cycle 
The cognition cycle in cognitive radio architecture includes a temporal organization and 
flow of inferences and control states, Mitola described the states in this cycle as Observe-
Orient-Plan-Decide-Act-Learn as shown in Figure 2-1 courtesy of Hossain et al.[21]. This 
cycle describes the major functions of cognitive radio which are required to adapt the 
transmission parameters according to the changing environment.  
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Figure 2-1: Cognitive cycle [27] 
The cognitive cycle can be broadly categorised into three dynamic sharing processes, 
spectrum sensing, spectrum analysis and spectrum decision as shown in Figure 2-2 as 
adapted from [29]. 
 
Figure 2-2: Basic cognitive cycle for dynamic sharing [29] 
2.2.2.1 Spectrum Sensing 
The goal of spectrum sensing is to determine the status of the spectrum by monitoring the 
target spectrum band to detect spectrum holes (band, location and time) as well as the 
activity of the licensed users. A cognitive radio transceiver is also able to determine the 
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method of accessing the spectrum hole without interfering with the transmission of a 
licensed user.   
 
Spectrum sensing can either be centralised or distributed. Centralised spectrum sensing 
reduces the complexity of the user terminals as a sensing controller senses the target 
frequency and relays it to the other nodes in the system. In the distributed spectrum 
sensing, the unlicensed users perform the spectrum sensing independently, if the results 
are used by individual cognitive radios it is known as non-cooperative sensing, whereas 
in cooperative sensing, the results are shared with other users. There are three major types 
of spectrum sensing, non-cooperative sensing, cooperative sensing and interference based 
sensing as discussed in [27] 
 
Sensed spectra can be classified into the following as highlighted in [30]: 
 Black spectrum holes: spectra is fully occupied and should be avoided when their 
emitters are on; 
 Gray spectrum holes: spectra is partially occupied and can act as candidates for 
prospective service operators; 
 White spectrum holes: spectra are free and are candidates for prospective service 
operators.  
2.2.2.2 Spectrum Analysis 
The goal of spectrum analysis is to schedule and plan spectrum access by the unlicensed 
users from the information obtained from spectrum sensing and performs channel state 
estimation to determine estimation of the spectrum hole to derive a model for increased 
efficiency. Spectrum analysis characterises the different spectrum bands in terms of 
operating frequency, bandwidth, interference, primary user activity and channel capacity. 
[27] 
2.2.2.3 Spectrum Decision 
Once the information from spectrum sensing is analysed to gain knowledge of the 
spectrum holes, a decision to access the spectrum is made by optimising the system 
performance given the desired objectives and constraints as per [27]. The cognitive radio 
determines the channel capacity, spectrum hole information, data rate and bandwidth of 
the transmission to determine the appropriate spectrum band for transmission of the 
signal.  
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2.2.3 Cognitive Radio Applications 
As cognitive radio plays a significant role in making the best use of scarce spectrum, [27] 
lists where cognitive radio can be applied to a variety of wireless communications 
scenarios:  
 Next generation wireless networks 
 Coexistence of different wireless technologies 
 eHealth services 
 Intelligent transportation system 
 Emergency networks 
 Military networks 
 TV bands for smart grid 
 Public safety 
 Broadband cellular 
2.2.4 Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) 
The idea behind DSA is inspired by spectrum occupancy measurements that indicated a 
number of instances where assigned spectrum is only used for brief periods of time [1]. 
DSA was introduced to maximise flexibility of spectrum use, account all dimensions of 
spectrum use and promote efficient use of the spectrum, as there was a need for spectrum 
reform. Dynamic spectrum access is defined by [27] as “a mechanism to adjust the 
spectrum resource usage in a near-real-time manner in response to the changing 
environment and objective (e.g. available channel and type of applications), changes of 
radio state (e.g. transmission mode, battery status, and location), and changes in 
environment and external constraints (e.g. radio propagation, operational policy)”.  
 
Dynamic access strategies can be broadly categorized into three models, Dynamic 
Exclusive Use Model, Open Sharing Model and Hierarchical Access Model as in [23]. 
Taxonomy of the models is shown below in Figure 2-3 as adapted from [23]. The 
differences in these models are: 
 Dynamic Exclusive Use Model: the spectrum bands are licenced to services for 
exclusive use under a certain rule. In this model the licenser (government) 
allocates the spectrum to the licensee. Two approaches have been proposed under 
this model, viz. spectrum property rights and dynamic spectrum allocation. 
Spectrum property rights allow licensees to freely sell and trade spectrum and 
choose their technology which can be seen as long term exclusive use, whereas in 
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the dynamic spectrum allocation spectrum allocation is performed at finer scale 
and the allocations varies at a much faster scale than the current policy and the 
spectrum is allocated to secondary users for a relatively short period. In the 
dynamic exclusive use model, there are three sub models for the secondary 
market, non-real time secondary market, real time secondary market for 
homogenous multi-operator sharing and heterogeneous multi-operator sharing.  
[23][27] 
 Open Sharing Model (also referred to as spectrum commons): all cognitive radio 
users have the same right to access the radio spectrum as a basis for managing a 
spectral region. The three variants of this model are, uncontrolled, managed and 
private-commons sub models. The simplest form is the uncontrolled sub model 
and this could result in tragedy of the commons, where a cognitive radio user 
suffers from interference. 
 Hierarchical Access Model (also referred to as shared use): the radio spectrum 
can simultaneously be shared between primary users and secondary users. 
Secondary users can opportunistically access the spectrum if it is not occupied or 
fully utilised by primary users with limited interference on the active primary 
users. There are two approaches that allow secondary users to exploit the unused 
spectrum band without causing interference to active primary users, namely 
spectrum underlay and spectrum overlay. In the spectrum underlay the 
transmission power of the secondary user is constrained to operate below the 
inference temperature limit of primary users, whereas in spectrum overlay no 
constraints are imposed and secondary users can identify and exploit spectrum 
holes defined in frequency, time and space. [27] 
 
Figure 2-3: Taxonomy of dynamic spectrum access [23] 
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In a dynamic spectrum model, efficient usage of the spectrum can be achieved by 
allowing secondary users to utilise the licenced band while the band is not being utilised 
by the primary users provided that interference to the primary user is kept insignificant.  
 
When the licenced band is not utilised, it is known as spectrum hole, i.e. a band free for 
utilization. The spectrum usage can thus be modelled as an ON-OFF process, where an 
OFF indication indicates the spectrum is unoccupied (spectrum hole). Due to each state of 
the system being independent of the past and future states, [21] suggests that the spectrum 
dynamics can be modelled as a Semi-Markov process. 
 
There are two methods that spectrum can be shared, horizontally and vertically. 
Horizontal sharing refers to a sharing scheme between radio systems with equal 
regulatory priority, without causing interference and vertical sharing refers to a sharing 
scheme between licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users. The operations 
of cognitive radio fall within vertical spectrum sharing.  
 
The two major phases in dynamic spectrum are spectrum exploration (sensing and 
analysis) and spectrum exploitation (decide and handoff). 
 
From an economic viewpoint, spectrum trading can generate more revenue for the 
spectrum owner and also enhance the satisfaction of cognitive radio users. 
 
2.3 Television Whitespaces Band 
As discussed in [32], “According to the ITU report “Digital Dividend: Insights for 
spectrum decisions”, TV white spaces (TVWS) are “portions of spectrum left unused by 
broadcasting, also referred to as interleaved spectrum””. The spectrum lying in the 470 
to 862 MHz, more commonly known as the TV spectrum, has been known to have 
desirable properties in the market, due to its nature to travel further and penetrate 
buildings more easily than higher frequencies. TVWS are referred to as the currently 
unoccupied portions of spectrum in the terrestrial television frequency bands in the VHF 
and UHF TV spectrum (analogue or digital). “These TV spectrum gaps, with 
advantageous propagation properties inherent to UHF spectrum (excellent outdoor and 
indoor coverage and non-line-of-sight propagation properties) have been identified in 
some administrations as an alternative for providing commercial wireless services other 
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than broadcasting” is highlighted in [32],. Both properties well exploited by TV 
broadcasters may now very well be exploited by other operators, with the digital dividend 
clearing up TV usage from the spectrum band.  
 
The digital dividend refers to the spectrum that will be released in the process of digital 
TV migration. Currently the broadcasting systems transmit in analogue which 
inefficiently uses the spectrum, when the broadcasters switch from analogue platforms to 
digital only platforms; part of the spectrum band that has been used for broadcasting will 
be freed up as digital broadcasting requires a smaller spectrum band. The bands freed up 
are high demand spectrum resources due to its desirable properties. Digital technologies 
are more robust and can accommodate more services on the same spectrum channel hence 
utilising spectrum more efficiently. Proposed utilization of the released spectrum, [33], 
includes use for broadband wireless access services such as mobile services as it is 
cheaper than fixed broadband to provide last mile connectivity.  
 
The available TVWS spectrum available can vary according to geographical features, 
level of interference potential to the TV broadcasting service, TV coverage objectives and 
television channels utilization. The availability of the TVWS spectrum can be classified 
according to, [32] 
 Frequency: idle channels of a TV band plan due to frequency separation 
 Height: the availability of TVWS in a given area in terms of the height of the 
TVWS transmission site and its antennae height in relation to the surrounding TV 
broadcasting coverage reception. 
 Space: geographical areas outside the current TV coverage and therefore no 
broadcasting signal are present.  
The classifications are not limited to frequency, space and height and can also be 
classified by the time domain for example.  
 
Some of the wireless technologies being explored in TVWS, [33], are low-power, 
machine-to-machine (M2M) communication devices, low-power wireless broadband 
applications, military applications, private and public mobile electronic communications 
and broadcasting, capitalizing on the longer coverage (propagation and capacity 
bandwidth) ranges achievable with VHF/UHF band.  
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2.4 Introduction to Game theory 
Game theory is a mathematical framework of models that formally study conflict and 
cooperation and allow for analysis and understanding of strategic scenarios. According to 
[5] it is “the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among economic agents 
produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where the 
outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents”. Game theoretic 
concepts apply to several decision makers (known as agents) who are all concerned with 
their own benefit (known as payoff).  
 
Game theory has been applied to many facets of various study fields, one of which is 
cognitive radio and the pricing thereof of spectrum. Below a brief history of game theory 
is given along with concepts general to game theory.  
2.4.1 History of Game Theory 
In 1838, Antoine Cournot illustrated one of the earliest examples of a game-theoretic 
analysis of a duopoly. The foundation of the field was later laid in 1944 in the publication 
of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by J Von Neumann and O Morgensten 
[25]. This book provided much of the basic terminology and problem setup such as the 
two-person zero-sum game.  
 
The concept of equilibrium was defined in 1950 by John Nash as well as named after him 
as the Nash equilibrium. Nash demonstrate that finite games always have an equilibrium 
point at which all players choose actions which are best for them given their opponents’ 
choices of action or strategies. Nash equilibrium provides a general solution to mutually 
consistent strategies of players. The concept of non-cooperative game theory has been a 
focal point of analysis since then. 
 
During the 1950’s and 1960’s, game theory broadened theoretically and was applied to 
problems of war, politics, psychology and sociology. Since the 1970’s it has been said to 
have driven a revolution in economic theory. In 1974, the concept of correlated 
equilibrium was introduced by R Aumann. In 1994, special attention was awarded to 
game theory with the receiving of Nobel prizes in economics to J Nash, J Harsanyi and R 
Selten. 
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In the late 1990’s, the concept of the auction was developed as a high-profile application 
of game theory. Many auctions were designed with the goal of allocating electromagnetic 
spectrum to the mobile telecommunications industry more efficiently.  
2.4.2 Definition of a Game  
The game in game theory is a formal model of an interactive situation and usually 
involves several players, however one-player games do exist and they are termed a 
decision problem.  A game will lay out the players, their preferences, their information, 
the strategic actions available to them and how these influence the outcome.  
 
A game consists of three fundamental components: a set of players (participants in the 
game), a set of strategies (plans by each player that describe what action will be taken in 
any situation), and a set of payoffs for the given set of actions (rewards for each player 
for all combinations of strategies).  
 
The payoff (also referred to as utility) represents the motivations of the players, [27], “a 
utility function for a given player assigns a number for every possible outcome of the 
game with the property that a higher (or lower) number implies that the outcome is more 
preferred”  
 
A central assumption to many branches of game theory is that players are rational. A 
player is said to be rational,  [26], if they always chose an action which gives the outcome 
they most prefer (maximising their utilities), given what they expect their opponents to 
do. Therefore the goal of game theory is to predict how the game will be played by 
rational players or to give advice on how best to play the game against opponents that are 
rational.  
 
A famous and simple example of a game is “the prisoner’s dilemma”; which is a game in 
strategic form between two players (also known as the criminals). The two players are 
arrested for the same crime; however there is not enough evidence to convict either 
player. Both players are interviewed separately with two available strategies, ‘cooperate’ 
or ‘defect’, if a player defects, they testify to convict the other player with the payoff of a 
reduced sentence or to go free and the convicted player is imprisoned. If both players 
cooperate, the payoff is high for both players (as neither can be convicted) and if both 
defect, they both get a reduced sentence (which can be described as a null result). If one 
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player cooperates and one defects, one player will have a higher payoff than the other.  
Each player’s preference is based on the jail time they individually serve.  The dilemma 
each player faces is the choice between the two strategies, where good decisions cannot 
be made with without information. The player that goes first will always choose to defect 
due to the rationality of the player; however this leads to an inefficient outcome as the 
best payoff for each player is cooperation.  
 
Generally game theory can be described formally as either cooperative or non-
cooperative.  
2.4.2.1 Cooperative Game 
Cooperative games also known as coalitional games provide a high-level description 
specify only what payoffs each potential group can obtain by cooperation of its members. 
Cooperation of the members entails agreement of the members to the adopted strategy 
and payoff function that accrues to the group. Cooperative games do not detail the 
process by which the coalition forms. Coopertive game theory focuses solely on the 
outcome of the game and investigates games with respect to the relative amounts of 
power held by various players, or how a successful coalition should divide its proceeds. 
In a cooperative game, there is no competition between the players in the group and they 
act as a single entity to maximise the total group utility.  
2.4.2.2 Non-Cooperative Game 
Non-cooperative games on the other hand are concerned with the analysis of the strategic 
choices or of the strategic interactions between selfish players competing in a game for 
their own interest to maximise their own profit. In this branch of game theory the non-
cooperation explicitly models the process of the players making choices out of their own 
interest, cooperation can arise in non-cooperative game models when players find it in 
their best interest. A non-cooperative game theoretical framework is often used to obtain 
an equilibrium solution that optimizes the payoffs of all players. A non-cooperative game 
may be the only choice for the individual to play if the information is strictly limited to 
local information, however this game may have a very low-efficiency outcome. One of 
the most widely used solutions for a non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium and 
will be discussed in detail later on.  
 
“A non-cooperative game is one in which players are unable to make enforceable 
contracts outside of those specifically modelled in the game. Hence, it is not defined as 
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games in which players do not cooperate, but as games in which any cooperation must be 
self-enforcing” as defined in [27]. 
 
“A static game is one in which all players make decisions (or select a strategy) 
simultaneously, without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by other 
players”, [27]. The game is said to be simultaneous as the players have no information 
about the decisions of the other players.  
 
A basic type of game studied in non-cooperative game theory is strategic-form also 
known as normal form.  In the strategic form, a game lists each player’s strategies, and 
the outcomes that result from each possible combination of choices. The outcomes that 
result are represented by a separate payoff for each player, which is a number (also 
known as utility) that measures how much the player likes the outcome. In the normal 
form, a simultaneous game is represented by a matrix; where for two players, one is 
represented by the rows and the other by the columns. Each row or column represents the 
payoff for each player for every combination of strategies. 
 
A strategic-form game consists of three objects: 
1. Players. A set of agents who play the game,               with typical element 
    ℕ  
2. Strategies. For each     ℕ there is nonempty set of strategies    with typical 
elements       
3. Payoffs. A payoff function        assigned to each player  , where S = 
       
s   S =        is known as a strategy profile 
 
A strategic-form game is represented by: 
   ⟨                   ⟩                    (1) 
 
A more detailed game than the strategic form is an extensive form also known as a game 
tree. Extensive form describes completely how the game is played over time and includes 
the order in which players take actions, the information that players have at the time they 
must take those actions, the times at which any uncertainty in the situation is resolved and 
the rules of the game. In the extensive form, a sequential game is represented graphically 
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and provides information about the players, payoffs, strategies and the order of moves. 
The graphical representation contains nodes (or vertices) to represent points at which 
players can take actions and edges to represent the actions that may be taken at that node. 
The nodes are connected by edges. An initial node will represent the first decision that 
can be made and terminal nodes represent an end of the game. The terminal node is 
therefore labelled with the payoff earned by each player.  
 
An extensive-form game with perfect information consists of: 
1. Players. A set of players with typical element     ℕ 
2. Histories. A set of histories with typical member        is a sequence of 
actions by individual players.     , but there is no          where   is an 
action for some player, than   is “terminal”. Set of terminal histories is denoted as 
     
3. Player function. A function         ℕ  assigning a player to each non-
terminal history 
4. Payoffs. vNM payoffs for each    ℕ are defined over terminal histories      
  (A vNM payoff is when there exists a real-valued function defined by possible 
outcomes such that every preference of the player is characterized by maximizing 
the expected value of the function) 
 
An extensive-form game is represented by: 
   ⟨              ⟩             (2) 
 
When there are multiple strategies available to the players of the game, the player will act 
rationally and chose the outcome they prefer, [27]. For each user there is a strategy space 
where some of the strategies are superior to the other due to the player’s interests. A 
strategy is known as dominant strategy if regardless of what the other players do, the 
strategy earns the player the higher payoff than any other, [27]. If one strategy is 
dominant, all other strategies are dominated. A strategy is said to be a dominated strategy 
if regardless of what the other players do, the strategy earns the player a lower payoff 
than another strategy. A rational player will never chose to play a dominated strategy and 
will always play the dominant strategy in equilibrium regardless of what the other players 
do, [27].  
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When all information of past strategies and corresponding payoffs are known to each 
player, it is called a game with perfect information; otherwise it is regarded as a game 
with imperfect information. 
 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) also known as strategic equilibrium is defined as, [27], the 
solution at which any player in the game cannot achieve a better solution by deviating 
unilaterally; given the actions of the other players (i.e. every player will select a payoff 
maximising strategy given the strategies of every other player). Nash Equilibrium is used 
to recommend a strategy to the players when there is no dominated strategy, since the 
players are assumed to be rational, it is reasonable for each player to expect his opponents 
to follow the recommendation as well. Players are said to be in equilibrium if a change in 
strategies by any one of the players will lead that player to earn less than if they remained 
with their current strategy.  
 
A Nash Equilibrium strategy profile      such that for each    , 
      
     
            
                  (3) 
At   , no   regrets playing   
 ; given all the other players’ actions,   could not have done 
better. 
 
In some games, it is possible to have more than one NE, if this is the case, a theory of 
strategic interaction should guide the players towards the most reasonable equilibrium 
upon which they should focus. Among all these equlibria, the optimal one needs to be 
selected, one of the criteria to determine this is by Pareto optimality. The Pareto 
Optimality, [27], is a measure of efficiency and the outcome of game is said to be Pareto 
optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at 
least one player better off. Usually a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon 
without resulting in a lower payoff to at least one player. NE is not Pareto optimal; hence 
the player’s payoffs can all be increased, [27].  
 
A game in strategic form does not always a have a NE in which each player 
deterministically chooses their strategies, players may instead randomly choose from 
among pure strategies with certain probabilities. A pure strategy describes a strategy of a 
player concerned in the game that takes it from one state to the other and is a specific 
move or action that a player will follow in every possible attainable situation in a game. 
Randomizing ones choice to choose among pure strategies is known as a mixed strategy. 
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A mixed strategy is defined as an active randomization, with given probabilities, which 
determine the player’s decision. The probability distribution is based on how frequently 
each move is about to play. A player will play a mixed strategy when they are indifferent 
to several pure strategies as well as if the opponent benefits from knowing the next move 
(mixed strategies will allow the opponent to keep guessing). In a special case, a mixed 
strategy can be the deterministic choice of one of the given pure strategies [26]. From 
these definitions it is given that every finite strategic game has a mixed strategy NE (as 
illustrated by Nash in 1951). 
 
Nash equilibria of non-cooperative static games often have low efficiency and this can be 
overcome with use of pricing and referee-based approaches. 
2.4.3 Game Theory and Cognitive Radio Networks  
In the cognitive radio environment game theory provides a mathematical tool to model 
strategic interactions among players (secondary and primary users) using formalized 
incentive structures as well as deriving well-defined equilibriums criteria to study the 
optimality of game outcomes under various scenarios, [1]. It aims to model and analyse 
the cognitive interaction process, designing efficient, self-enforcing, distributed and 
scalable sharing schemes due to the fact that the surrounding radio environment is 
constantly experiencing changes. Unreliable wireless channels, traffic variations, and user 
mobility and dynamic topology bring about these changes in the environment. 
 
In the cognitive radio environment, game theory aims to study the intelligent behaviours 
and interactions of selfish network users. Users are said to be selfish as they all compete 
for spectrum resources and may have no incentive to cooperate with other users, e.g. with 
primary users and secondary users competing for the spectrum resources, if primary users 
are selfish, the secondary users may never/rarely contract spectrum resources.  
 
“The importance of studying cognitive radio networks in a game theoretic framework is 
multifold.” The network users’ behaviors and actions can be analyzed by modeling 
dynamic spectrum sharing among the users as a formalized game structure, where the 
theoretical achievements in game theory can be fully utilized. Game theory also allows 
for various optimality criteria for the spectrum-sharing problem as it provides well-
defined equilibrium criteria to measure game optimality under various game setting since 
it is difficult to analyze and solve multi-objective optimization problems (such as 
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optimization of spectrum usage). An important branch of game theory is non-cooperative 
game theory, [2], as it enables derivation of efficient distributed approaches for dynamic 
spectrum sharing using only local information, these approaches are highly desirable 
when centralized control is not available or flexible self-organized approaches are 
necessary.  
 
The spectrum sharing schemes can be classified into four categories, non-cooperative, 
cooperative, stochastic and economic and auction games, [2]. “With economic and 
auction games the spectrum resources are traded like exchangeable goods in a spectrum 
market. Stochastic spectrum sharing games allow users to adapt their strategies 
accordingly with the changing environment.” [2] 
 
For the cognitive cycle, a cognitive radio observes the environment and sets the 
intelligent move, which can be mapped into a game. The cognitive radio users are the 
players in the game, the payoff is the utility, the observations are the arguments of the 
utility function, and the outside world can be interpreted as the outcome space of the 
game. 
 
2.5 Economic Theories in Dynamic Spectrum Access 
2.5.1 Utility Theory 
Utility is defined as the usefulness, the ability of something to satisfy needs or wants. In 
the cognitive radio environment, the concept of utility can be used to quantify the 
satisfaction of a cognitive radio entity, [27]. The fundamental concept of utility is 
preference, which is used to indicate the consumer’s preference among the different 
options. Utilities types include ordinal utility to indicate preference, cardinal utility to 
indicate the percentage of preference and marginal utility to indicate rate of increase in 
utility. Marginal utility is useful for utility maximization.  
 
A rational user will always try to maximise their utility by making the best decision, 
however this is also based on the prices of the commodities and the level of the consumer 
income. Consumer income will dictate the amount of money that the consumer can spend 
per unit of time. 
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Utility maximisation is complex due to the limited amount of information available on the 
utility of each commodity. To reach the highest utility due to consumption over time, the 
consumer can learn and adapt the decision over time, known as bounded rationality.  
 
A utility function to quantify user satisfaction can be defined by, 
             
                                                                    
where    [            ] denotes a vector containing different quantities of each of 
the commodities,  . The vector, , is known as the consumption plan of the consumer. 
 
The marginal utility can be determined by the first derivative of the utility function.  
 
The concept of utility in a cognitive radio environment can be used to provide a layer of 
abstraction for QoS or formulation of a radio resource model and represents the payoff of 
each entity in a game formulation. Together with game theory and classical optimization, 
utility functions can be used for radio resource allocation in wireless networks.  
 
One of the major factors that affect customers satisfaction is price, the concept of net 
utility can be used to indicate the satisfaction on both the price and performance.  
2.5.2 Market Equilibrium 
Market equilibrium is a condition where a market price is established through 
competition such that the amount of goods or services sought by buyers (demand 
function) is equal to the amount of goods or services produced by sellers (supply 
function). The supply function is represented by      and is a function of price,  . The 
demand function is represented by      and is also a function of price,  . The amount of 
supply from the seller is an increasing function of price, whereas the demand for the 
goods or services is a decreasing function of price.  
 
The concept of a market-equilibrium price can be used to satisfy both sellers and buyers 
and the market-equilibrium price    is given by, 
                                                                             
The market-equilibrium price is the best possible strategy for both the sellers and buyers 
and it would be undesirable for either to deviate from this price without an incentive. The 
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market-equilibrium price also ensures that there is no excess supply in the market and all 
spectrum demand is satisfied, [27]. 
2.5.3 Oligopoly Market  
An oligopoly market is a market whereby a small number of firms (known as 
oligopolists) dominate a particular market, [27]. These firms compete with each other 
independently to sell a commodity and maximise their profit. The commodity supplied by 
the firms can either be homogenous or differentiated, where for a homogenous 
commodity, all firms produce the same commodity and for a differentiated commodity, 
each firm produces different commodity for which each of them is substitutable. As each 
commodity may not be perfectly substitutable (could be due to the difference in quality of 
propagation and/or interference conditions), the competition among the firms is affected 
by the level of substitutability. These firms also control the amount of supply as well the 
price of the goods/service and the amount of supply or the offered price not only affects 
its profit but also the profit of the other firms. [27] 
 
With few sellers, each oligopolist is likely to be aware of the actions of the others. The 
decisions of one firm therefore influence and are influenced by the decisions of other 
firms. Strategic planning by oligopolists needs to take into account the likely responses of 
the other market participants. 
 
“In a cognitive radio network, a firm could be analogous to a primary user or a primary 
service provider. The primary service providers compete with each other to sell the 
spectrum opportunities to the secondary users or secondary service providers. The 
objective of a primary service provider is to maximize the profit of selling the spectrum 
opportunities” (i.e. rational behaviour). [27] 
 
To analyse and predict the behaviour of the firms in an oligopoly market, the theory of 
non-cooperative games can be utilised (Section 2.4.2.2). The players in this game are the 
firms, the strategy is the supplied quantity or the offered price and the payoff is given by 
the profit of the firm.  The three classical game theoretic models used to model the 
oligopoly market are the Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models. Each model has 
different market structures and the strategies used in the competition differ.  
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To illustrate the behaviour of these three models, a market with two firms (a duopoly) is 
considered for simplicity sake. In a duopoly the total number of players is two. A linear 
demand function is assumed, 
       –                                                                        
and the inverse demand function is expressed as,[27] 
                                   
 
 
        
 
 
                       
2.5.3.1 Cournot Model 
In the Cournot model, the firms compete in terms of the amount of supply to the market 
and choose their quantities independently and simultaneously. In Cournot competition 
there is more than one firm and there is no product differentiation (homogenous product 
produced). The customers react to the price that they are willing to pay for the supplied 
quantity. The price is determined by the inverse demand function (7).  
 
As the firms compete for the amount of supply to the market, the supplied quantity of one 
firm will affect the market price of the commodity, and therefore the profit of the other 
firms. The firms can be said to be economically rational and act strategically, seeking to 
maximize their profit given their competitors' decisions never colluding with one another. 
 
Assume a production cost of C per unit of commodity and fixed cost of Cf then the profit 
can be expressed as, [27] 
  (     )   (      )                                                      
             (     (     ))                                           
where    and    are the supplied quantity for the duopoly market from firms   and 
   respectively. As the objective of each firm is to maximise its profit, the best response of 
each firm can be obtained by finding the optimal amount of supplied quantity which 
maximises the profit given the amount of the supply from the other firms. The optimal 
amount supplied can be determined at the point where the derivative of the profit is equal 
to zero, [27] 
   (     )
   
          (       )                                             
    
     (  )   
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Similarly the best response of firm   can be derived. It can be seen that as the supplied 
quantity for firm 1 increases, their profit increases to a point until there is an abundance 
of supply, at this point the profit starts decreasing. The point at which the profit starts 
decreasing is known as the best response for firm   as it gives the highest profit to firm     
 
The solution to a Cournot game is Nash equilibrium, which gives the optimal amount of 
supply which maximises the profits of the firms. In the Cournot model, the Nash 
equilibrium can be expressed by, [27] 
  (  
 )       
                                                                 
Graphically the Nash equilibrium is the point where the best responses of the two firms 
intersect each other and can be obtained mathematically from, 
(  
    
 )  (
     
   
 
     
   
)                                             
At Nash equilibrium, none of the firms can have a better profit without adjustment in the 
supplied quantity from the other firms.  
2.5.3.2 Bertrand Model 
In a Bertrand model, all firms make their decision simultaneously in terms of price and 
choose their prices independently; customers choose their quantities (demand) based on 
the price and the production capacity is unlimited, [27]. Both firms have the same 
constant unit cost of production, so that marginal and average costs are the same and 
equal to the competitive price. The firms competing choose their price so that their profit 
is maximised given the prices chosen by the other firms. The solution of a Bertrand game 
is dependent on the substitutability of the commodity, in the case of a homogenous 
commodity, the customer can choose to buy the commodity from any of the firms and 
will always choose the firm with a lower price, whereas for a differentiated commodity, 
the demand functions for the commodity from the different firms are different and 
dependant on the prices of all firms whose commodities are substitutable, [27]. In the 
case of a homogenous commodity, there is a unique Nash equilibrium where all the prices 
charged by the firms are identical and the price is identical to the production cost. This is 
due to the fact that the firm with the cheapest price will supply the entire market; if 
another firm decreases its price to lower than firm 1 then firm 2 will now supply the 
entire market and the other firms will have zero profit, therefore they too need to decrease 
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their price. The equilibrium of a homogenous Bertrand game can be seen to be trivial, 
[27]. 
 
Therefore for a Bertrand game, a differentiated commodity can be described by the 
following demand functions: [27] 
  (     )                                                            
  (     )   ̃    ̃    ̃                                                  
where A, B, D,  ̃,  ̃,  ̃are constants of the demand functions (D and  ̃ indicate the level 
of substitutability). The demand functions in (13) and (14) indicate if the price from firm 
  increases, the demand for the commodity from firm   will decrease and if the price from 
firm   decreases, the demand for the commodity from firm   also decreases. The profit of 
firm   is represented by, [27] 
  (     )                                                                 
 (          )                                  
The profit of firm   can be derived similarly to that of    The best response of firm   can 
be derived by differentiating the profit with respect to the price of firm    [27] 
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Similarly, the best response of firm j can be derived. Graphically the Nash equilibrium is 
located at the points where the best responses of the firms intersect with each other, 
mathematically the Nash equilibrium can be found to be, [27] 
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The substitutability of the commodity affects the slope of the best response functions as 
well as the location of the Nash equilibrium.  
2.5.3.3 Stackelberg Model 
In a Stackelberg model, there is a firm (referred to as a leader) who is able to make 
decisions (commit to the chosen strategy) on the supplied quantity or price before other 
firms (i.e. followers). These followers then make their decisions by taking into account 
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the decision of the leader (the decision taken by the follower is the optimal strategy based 
on the observed strategy chosen by the leader). These firms compete with each other in 
terms of supplied quantity or price and move sequentially.  
 
The solution of a Stackelberg game can be seen to be the set of strategies where the profit 
of the leader is maximised and the followers choose their best response; this is known as 
the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Stackelberg equilibrium can be obtained by backward 
induction, where the best response of the follower is obtained first and then given the 
followers best response, the leader optimises its strategy to achieve the highest profit. 
 
The profit attained by follower   can be computed from, [27] 
  (     )   ( 
    (     ))                                           
and the best response of this follower is given by, [27] 
  
       
           
   
                                                            
As the objective of the leader is maximise its profit, the profit of leader   is given by, [27] 
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    (     
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By differentiating the profit function (22) with respect to the strategy of the leader (   , 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be determined, [27] 
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Based on the optimal strategy of the leader, the optimal strategy for the follower is,  
  
           
     
   
                                                     
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the optimal strategy for the leader if the leader 
can make a decision before the follower. [27] 
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Graphically the Nash equilibrium can be represented by the point where the best 
responses of both firms meet and this is not the same point as the Stackelberg 
equilibrium. At the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader offers a larger supplied quantity 
than that of the follower, consequently the profit of the leader is higher (also known as 
first-move advantage).  Mathematically, the Stackelberg equilibrium is represented by,  
(  
    
 )  (
     
   
 
     
   
)                                                
2.5.4 Auction Theory 
“An auction is a process used to obtain the price of a commodity with an undetermined 
value”, [27]. Typically there are three categories of an auction, supply auction, demand 
auction and a double auction. In the supply auction, multiple sellers offer their 
commodities to a buyer whereas in a demand auction multiple buyers bid for a 
commodity being sold by a seller, [27]. The double auction has multiple buyers bidding 
to buy commodities from multiple sellers.  
 
The components of an auction market include: 
 A seller: Market entity selling a commodity who offers the price and amount of 
the commodity to be traded by the auction 
 The buyer: Market entity buying the commodity from the seller and submits a bid 
in terms of price and bidding quantity through the auction 
 The trading/clearing price: The price of each commodity to be traded in the 
auction market 
 
In a cognitive radio environment, auction models can be used to sell the allocated band to 
the highest bidder for a defined period. The different types of single-side auction models 
include the English auction, the Dutch auction, Sealed High-bid auction and the Vickrey 
auction. A single-side auction occurs when there is one auctioneer. Double auction based 
pricing may be used when there are multiple sellers (licensed users) and multiple buyers 
(unlicensed users). 
 
In the English auction, buyers would bid the highest price they are willing to pay and the 
item would be sold to the highest bidder. The bid is said to be dynamic as the bidders are 
aware of the other bidder’s bids and can change their bids accordingly. The bid would 
start at the seller’s reserve price which is the lowest the item can be sold for. 
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In a Dutch auction, the bidder who bids the quickest wins the auction. The item is bid at 
the highest price and the price is decremented at certain intervals, once a bidder indicates 
the buying signal, the item is sold. The Dutch auction is also known as a one-shot auction. 
An extension of the Dutch auction is the Anglo-Dutch auction whereby an ascending 
auction is run instead and all but two bidders have dropped out. The final bids of the two 
bidders are presented in sealed offers and the higher bidder wins the auction (provided the 
bids are higher than the current asking bid). 
 
The Sealed High-Bid auction is also known as the First-Price Sealed-Bid auction, and the 
auction is awarded to the highest bidder. The auction takes place in one round and all bids 
are submitted sealed. 
 
Similar to the English auction is the Vickrey auction or the second price auction, however 
the winner of the auction with the highest bid pays the second highest bids price.  
 
Shortfalls of auctions are winners-curse, where there is a tendency for the winning bid to 
exceed the value of the item purchased). A comparison of the different types of bids is 
given in [24]. 
 
Spectrum auction can be jointly designed with a resource allocation framework.  
 
2.6 Economics of Dynamic Spectrum Access: Spectrum Trading 
2.6.1 Spectrum Trading 
The process of selling/leasing spectrum underutilised by primary users to secondary users 
is known as spectrum trading. The seller would first be the Government for spectrum 
allocation as the Government owns the spectrum and thereafter or post-allocation the 
operators would become the sellers, reselling their portion of the underutilised spectrum. 
The market where the Government is allocating spectrum to primary users is known as 
the primary market, due to the regulatory requirements from the Government, the process 
of spectrum allocation is lengthy and inflexible. As the secondary market is not controlled 
by the government it can be seen as an attractive tool to promote efficient use of the radio 
spectrum. The Government would aim to maximise their revenue and minimise budget 
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defects, whereas the operators aim to maximise their profit and wealth in the long run. 
[24] [27] 
 
From economics, trading is defined as “a process of exchanging a commodity or service 
in a market”, [27]. This process can be performed through direct exchange of a 
commodity or service or through a medium of exchange (generally money). This concept 
of trading can be applied to spectrum leasing in the secondary market and encompasses 
different dimensions of spectrum resources (i.e. frequency band, time slot). An important 
issue in spectrum trading is the pricing for both the licensed users selling spectrum and 
the unlicensed users buying the spectrum.  
 
As the seller increases the price to achieve a higher revenue, the utility of the buyer 
decreases due to a higher cost, similarly the QoS performance exhibits the same 
behaviour when spectrum allocation to unlicensed users are varied. Therefore, an optimal 
and stable solution for spectrum trading in terms of price and allocated spectrum is 
required to maximise the revenue of the seller and utility of the buyer while still 
satisfying both the seller and buyer and their solutions. 
 
When designing spectrum trading models to obtain an optimal and stable solution, 
different techniques can be applied, namely [27], 
 Microeconomic approach: in the microeconomics approach spectrum trading is 
modelled with two major entities, a spectrum seller and a spectrum buyer. The 
solution of this approach is based on market-equilibrium where the demand is 
equal to the supply and the profit of the seller and satisfaction of the buyer are 
maximised.  
 Classical optimization approach: in the classical optimization approach, spectrum 
trading is formulated as an optimization problem where there is a single objective 
under a set of constraints. The objective can change subject to the desired 
outcome, e.g. maximise profit of spectrum owner or maximise the utility of the 
cognitive radio user. The solution of this approach is “system-wise” optimal for 
the entire system as it only relies on a single objective function 
 Non-cooperative game approach: in the non-cooperative game approach, several 
entities are involved and they all have different, possibly conflicting, interests. 
The solution of such a model must satisfy all the entities involved.  
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 Bargaining game approach: in the bargaining game approach, the system entities 
can negotiate and bargain with each other to obtain a fair and efficient solution. 
This approach can be used when cognitive radio users can cooperate and each 
entity can influence the action of other entities during spectrum trading.  
 Auction approach: in the auction approach, the buyers submit their bids for 
spectrum and profit is maximised by allocating the spectrum to the bidder with 
the highest price.  
 
From an economic viewpoint, spectrum trading can be considered as a part of spectrum 
management (along with interference control, spectrum sharing, spectrum regulation, 
spectrum allocation and transmission adaptation) and is the process between spectrum 
exploration and exploitation.  
 
The two major structures of spectrum trading are, [27]: 
 Single seller (monopoly): There is only a single seller in this market and the seller 
can maximise its revenue given the demand from the buyers. The buyers only 
have the option to cooperate or compete with each other to buy spectrum from the 
seller and the choices made by the buyers affect the revenue directly. The seller 
has the option to adapt its parameters according to the behaviour of the market.  
 Multiple sellers (oligopoly): With multiple sellers in the market, the buyer can 
choose the offer to maximise their satisfaction in terms of performance and price, 
hence the revenue of a seller will be less than that in a monopoly.  
 
Alternatively, another option is the commons-use spectrum model where there is no 
permanent seller and all users have the right to access the spectrum. The issue with this 
model is that if a particular user requires more spectrum than another user, the other user 
will need to be compensated. 
 
When developing a spectrum trading model, the following aspects need to be considered, 
[27] 
 Mode: mode refers to two things, namely the change of spectrum ownership and 
the change of use due to spectrum trading. After spectrum trading is done, the 
spectrum ownership is transferred from the seller to the buyer, the buyer could 
also use the spectrum for a wireless service hence a change of use is possible.  
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 Extent: extent defines the degree of a spectrum owner’s rights and obligations that 
are transferred to the buyer, either shared or transferred completely. In the case of 
a complete transfer, all rights and obligations of spectrum access are completely 
transferred to the buyer, whereas in a shared transfer, both spectrum owner and 
buyer share the rights and obligations.  
 Duration: duration determines the length of time the buyer can access the traded 
spectrum for and the different scales of duration can be defined as short-term 
lease, long-term lease, sale-and-buy-back and permanent. Buyers are allowed to 
access the spectrum until the licence expires.  
 
Spectrum trading models can be classified according to infrastructure, configuration, 
activation and flexibility based on different criteria. The different classifications refer to, 
[27] 
 Infrastructure: the infrastructure used for spectrum trading can either be shared or 
non-shared (dedicated infrastructure). In the case of the shared infrastructure, 
there are multiple unlicensed users that share the same equipment, whereas in the 
dedicated infrastructure, each unlicensed user uses its own equipment to utilise 
the spectrum. 
 Configuration: the configuration for spectrum trading can either be centralised or 
distributed. For the case of centralised spectrum trading configuration, a spectrum 
broker is used to control the spectrum trading and the transmission parameters, 
whereas in distributed spectrum trading configuration each of the unlicensed users 
negotiates independently with a licensed user for spectrum trading. In the case of 
distributed configuration, the licensed users can either cooperate or compete to 
buy the spectrum from a licensed user.  
 Activation: activation of spectrum trading can be initiated by three types of users, 
spectrum owner (licensed user), cognitive radio user (unlicensed user) and jointly 
by the spectrum owner and cognitive radio user. The activation of spectrum 
trading can either be periodic or sporadic, where periodic spectrum trading entails 
spectrum being traded for a fixed period of time and sporadic spectrum trading 
entails spectrum trading being initiated at any point in time. 
 Flexibility: flexibility of spectrum trading can either be multiprotocol, restricted 
protocol or single protocol. In the case of multiprotocol, there is no restriction on 
the protocol to be used by an unlicensed user as opposed to restricted or single 
protocol where the licensed user determines a specific protocol or set of protocols 
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than an unlicensed user can use. This allows specification on the type of wireless 
service utilised.  
Another important issue in spectrum trading is information management which details the 
information necessary to be exchanged between buyers and sellers. Information flows 
required for spectrum trading include, [27] 
 Request and acknowledgement messages of spectrum trading from the licensed 
and unlicensed users: this includes the details of spectrum demand and spectrum 
supply as well as pricing information. 
 Spectrum access parameters: this includes the set of parameters for the unlicensed 
user to access the spectrum and is known as public information to licensed users. 
 Spectrum occupancy information: this includes information for an unlicensed user 
to identify the spectrum opportunities and initiate spectrum trading as well the 
spectrum supply which will be sold to an unlicensed user. 
 Report on spectrum access: this information is used by the licensed users and 
contains information on spectrum utilization and interference levels caused to the 
licensed users.  
2.6.2 Spectrum Pricing 
Price is defined as the rate at which anything can be exchanged for anything else, the 
scarcer and more useful a commodity is, the higher the economic price of the commodity. 
Spectrum is seen as a very useful and scarce resource, hence the price is high. From an 
economic pricing perspective, the pricing transaction may be considered from three 
aspects: those of the buyer, the seller and the wider industry or economy as a whole,[24]. 
 
The buyer would most likely be telecom operators in the telecom industry and these 
buyers would act as to maximise their utility under certain constraints. The seller on the 
other hand would first be the Government for spectrum allocation as the Government 
owns the spectrum and thereafter or post-allocation the operators would become the 
sellers, reselling their portion of the spectrum. The Government would aim to maximise 
their revenue and minimise budget defects, whereas the operators aim to maximise their 
profit and wealth in the long run, [24]. Each seller scenario would pose different price 
determination strategies and has to be analysed under different forms of competition. The 
third aspect for consideration is the industry or economy as a whole pricing which 
provides great influence on the buyer and seller. The two approaches for pricing in the 
industry are general equilibrium analysis and macroeconomics, [24]. 
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In a cognitive radio network, the problem of pricing is different to that in a traditional 
wireless network due to spectrum sharing and the adaptability of the licensed and 
unlicensed users. A licensed user can charge a price to an unlicensed user for spectrum 
access and this price can be dynamically adjusted according to the availability of 
spectrum opportunity. Spectrum opportunity is a function of traffic load in the licensed 
network and the demand from the unlicensed users. This demand is dependent on the 
current number of ongoing sessions and applications used by the unlicensed users.  
 
To avoid network congestion which degrades system performance, the number of users 
sharing the limited spectrum can be limited with use of an admission control mechanism 
together with the pricing scheme “To support a secure pricing scheme, an authentication 
mechanism is required to verify the users to access the spectrum. An authorization 
mechanism is used to grant access to the users. An accounting mechanism is used to 
record the usage statistics and calculate the price to be charged to the users”, [27]. 
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter builds on the concepts presented in Chapter 1 and presents summaries on 
various subjects that relate to the theme of spectrum trading, the technology that makes it 
viable and the methods of modelling a spectrum trading market. The introductory sections 
provide the concepts of the fundamental operational processes of the cognition cycle and 
dynamic spectrum sharing and provide definitions and an overview on a Software-
Defined radio and the cognitive cycle. Applications of cognitive radio are discussed with 
specific reference to spectrum sharing. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss a detailed 
introduction into game theory and economic theory, and the three pricing strategies, 
namely market-equilibrium pricing, competitive pricing and cooperative pricing, as 
solutions to the challenges of pricing strategies in cognitive networks. Under the 
economic theories in dynamic spectrum access, topics such as utility theory, market-
equilibrium, oligopoly market and auction theory are covered. Spectrum pricing and 
spectrum trading is then discussed in detail.  
 
The subsequent chapter provides a discussion on comparative approaches to spectrum 
trading models and regulation and is derived from literature and the South African 
context.  
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Chapter 3 
3 Comparative Approaches to Spectrum Trading Models and 
Regulation 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an overview is given of the existing work in the fields of spectrum 
sharing, game theory models applied to spectrum sharing, economic theories applied to 
spectrum sharing as well as the regulations imposed on spectrum trading.  
 
The concluding subsections discuss telecommunication regulations, the regulatory 
environment and the issue of spectrum licensing, its usage and the importance of 
spectrum sharing. 
 
This section is derived from literature and the South African context.  
3.2 Spectrum Sharing 
The scarcity of wireless spectrum, inefficient allocations of frequency and developments 
in network technologies has prompted a number of studies in this field towards spectrum 
management and trading/sharing. The spectrum sharing process can be divided into five 
major steps [6], spectrum sensing, spectrum allocation, spectrum access, transmitter-
receiver handshake and spectrum mobility.  Akyildiz et al. discusses the existing work 
performed that is aimed at providing solutions for each of these processes and provides a 
survey of dynamic spectrum access, cognitive radio wireless networks and next 
generation wireless networks with cognitive radios (including architecture frameworks) in 
[6]. Akyildiz et al. findings show extensive development of next generation networks by 
exploitation of the existing wireless spectrum opportunistically and highlights the 
necessity to ensure efficient spectrum-aware communication; further research is needed 
along the lines discussed in their survey. This paper shows insight into the capabilities of 
cognitive radio techniques, the communication protocols for efficient communication, 
spectrum management functionalities such as spectrum sensing, spectrum analysis and 
spectrum decision as well as spectrum mobility; which provides an overview and 
background of topics pertaining to spectrum trading. 
 
An important aspect of spectrum trading is the viability of spectrum trading within a 
country; an article in Techcentral, [7], discusses spectrum trading in SA and mentions that 
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the National Planning Commissions National Development Plan proposes that the 
country should allow companies to trade in scarce radio frequency spectrum and suggests 
mechanisms such as “spectrum auctions and reverse bids for underserviced areas” for 
radio frequency spectrum allocations. They also state that spectrum “should be fully 
tradeable once allocated”. The article goes further into discussing the opinions of 
industry players, where they all agree it would be a good move.  Steve Song, an industry 
player highlights “he is not aware of many global examples where spectrum trading has 
had a big impact” however he feels “there’s a lot of theoretical potential in the idea”. 
Steve Song and Henk Kleynhans both believe opening TV white spaces (TVWS) will 
have a bigger impact, as cognitive radio is the future of wireless telecommunications.   
 
Secondary spectrum trading in TVWS is discussed in [8]; the authors propose the use of a 
spectrum broker to manage the TVWS secondary spectrum market with two modes of 
trading operation, auction mode and merchant mode. The results from this study show 
“the secondary spectrum market in TVWS has the potential to support wireless 
communication services of multiple players, including mobile communication operators 
with continuously increasing spectrum demands” [8]. A discussion is also provided 
around successfully applied spectrum trading mechanisms in a real-world test scenario in 
Munich, Germany which showed the efficiency of the proposed market mechanisms 
(auction design). 
 
In Europe, an approach known as COGEU (Cognitive radio systems for efficient sharing 
of TVWS in EUropean context) is being investigated and developed to exploit TVWS. 
“COGEU proposes a bicameral (national) geolocation database separating bands for 
common usage and for secondary spectrum trading. The commons bands are for access 
without the need for guaranteed quality of service (QoS), while secondary trading bands 
are for access with guaranteed QoS”. Mwangoka, Marques and Rodriguez present the 
utilization of TVWS from the perspective of the COGEU project in [9].  The paper 
discusses challenges of exploiting TVWS in Europe and the COGEU framework before 
presenting the COGEU broker model for spectrum trading. The results from [9] show that 
“the COGEU project envisions exploiting the TVWS as tradable and flexible spectrum to 
expand the range of spectrum available over which key services can be provided with 
QoS guarantees if necessary.”  
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Although there have been many methods proposed for improved spectrum assignment 
there are still many issues related to their implementation, such as interference in a multi-
provider environment and determining the elements and architectures for feasible 
implementations of spectrum trading markets. An analysis of these issues is discussed in 
[10] with relation to the types of trading interactions in a spectrum trading market and the 
kinds of architectures that can be used to implement them. An issue highlighted in this 
paper is the difficulty of the regulatory agencies in managing spectrum due to the new 
technologies and new uses of the spectrum, which is possibly quite relevant to South 
Africa. The authors discuss the benefits of spectrum trading, [10]; highlighting that 
“spectrum trading can improve the efficiency of the initial distributions of spectrum by 
allowing the licensees to be those who value its use the most and by making use of the 
technology that provides the best economic gains.” Spectrum trading would allow for 
competition and stimulation of technological innovation.  
 
In [11], the conditions for viability of spectrum trading markets are discussed by 
considering scenarios with different market structures, number of trading participant’s 
amount of tradable spectrum. The authors find their models indicate that spectrum 
markets can be viable in a service if sufficient numbers of market participants exist and 
the amount of tradable spectrum is balanced to the demand. “A challenge for regulators 
and researchers alike will be identifying an appropriate band to promote spectrum 
trading or to facilitate the entry of new market participants”, [11]. 
 
In [12], the authors point out that scholars from as early as 1959 agree that spectrum 
trading can improve spectrum efficiency and focus on two aspects: “demonstrating the 
necessity of the introduction of spectrum trading and discussing how to promote it”. This 
paper analyses the incentives of spectrum trading from both a microeconomic and 
macroeconomic viewpoint and then focuses on the relationship between initial spectrum 
assignment and secondary spectrum trading.  
3.3 Game Theory Models Applied to Spectrum Trading/Sharing 
“Game formulations can be used for multiplayer optimization to achieve individual 
optimal solutions for resource allocation” [13]. Game theoretic models for resource 
allocation have mainly focused on admission control, throughput optimization, power 
control and channel allocation. This section discusses some of the related work.  
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Zhang and Yu published a survey on spectrum sharing in cognitive radio using game 
theory [15]. In this paper, they discuss basic elements of modelling by game theory 
before introducing several dynamic spectrum-sharing algorithms. 
 
Alptekin and Bener [17] discuss the pricing and transmission power control processes in 
terms of a one-shot non-cooperative game model and aim to determine the optimum price 
values for unit spectrum bands that maximise the primary service provider’s profits while 
protecting the social welfare of their network. They also discuss the impact of 
transmission power and flexibility on the offered spectrum size on the profit 
maximisation as well as unit prices. The results show power limitations directly influence 
the supply decisions of the primary service providers, spectrum trading with a centralised 
controller increases their profit and degrading the received quality of the primary users 
may be profitable for the primary service provider is some cases. Saraydar et al. presented 
a power control solution based on game theoretical framework for wireless data as 
discussed in [17]. 
 
In [42], Zhu et al investigates a duopoly pricing model which could be used for 
communication service competitions reselling IP-based service over Wireless Mesh 
Networks. A two-stage non-cooperative game is used to model the two access point 
providers, where stage 1 is the where the access point providers set their prices to 
maximise their profits respectively and stage 2 is when given the price and QoS 
combinations from both access point providers, the end-users decide whether or not to 
make use of the services and from which provider. The results show the end-users 
expected compensated utility (a function of the prices and the QoS offered by the access 
point providers). It is a key factor of the two access points to determine their prices such 
that Nash Equilibrium can be reached, [42]. 
 
Wang et al propose a novel auction-based model in [43] to characterise and analyse 
inherent features (such as competition among secondary users and uncertainty about the 
wireless environment for secondary users) in a dynamic spectrum sharing environment 
with one primary user and multiple secondary users sharing the same frequency spectrum. 
The results show the best response of each secondary user is a non-linear function of the 
other user’s strategy, and the Nash Equilibrium varies with different channel qualities, 
therefore a secondary user with a better channel quality prefers to bid a larger spectrum 
size, [43]. 
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3.4 Joint Game and Economic Models Applied to Spectrum 
Trading/Sharing 
With the use of different game models, a number of proposals have been made regarding 
pricing models and/or perspectives. Nel and Zhu in [1] have discussed the expansion of 
the work performed in [16] to model the use of the opportunistic spectrum access 
allowing secondary users to share the spectrum resources with primary users on an 
opportunistic basis using a three player Stackelberg game model. “In this game model, the 
service provider as the leader aims to enhance its revenue while improving the utilization 
of its channel by allowing opportunistic spectrum access without violating the primary 
users non-zero tolerated interference probability” [1]. Nel and Zhu aim to demonstrate 
that the service provider could earn more revenue with less secondary users when the 
channel is under-utilized by exploiting the secondary users’ willingness to pay. The 
simulation results from [1] show that under certain assumptions, dynamic spectrum 
access with secondary sharing can greatly improve the revenue for the service provider 
when the channel is under-utilised or over utilised; however by compensating the primary 
users due to interference caused by secondary users could result in a loss of revenue. The 
paper further shows that by exploiting the secondary user’s willingness to pay, the service 
provider could earn more from less secondary users when the channel utilization of the 
primary users is lower as the secondary users who can be allocated more bandwidth with 
better channel condition are more willing to pay.  
 
Niyato and Hossain present three different pricing and market models: market-
equilibrium, cooperative and competitive as discussed in [31].  These models are used to 
compare the prices offered by the service providers at equilibrium as well as the profit 
attained at equilibrium. The model in [31]  assumes a primary service provider services a 
number of primary users as well as secondary users. The service providers can set the 
offered price accordingly with one of the three pricing models. The market-equilibrium 
and cooperative pricing models are based on optimization problems whereas the 
competitive pricing model is based on a non-cooperative Bertrand game assuming the 
players are selfish and compete against one another for price, [31]  . The authors simulate 
static and dynamic models of the three pricing strategies and determine the cooperative 
pricing model returns the highest profit with the lowest stability and the market 
equilibrium has the lowest profit with the highest stability.  
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The Bertrand model used for competitive pricing is expanded in [14] and [40]. In [14] 
Niyato and Hossain discussed the problem of spectrum sharing among primary users and 
multiple secondary users and used a non-cooperative Bertrand game to model a spectrum 
overlay-based cognitive radio wireless system with one primary user and a number of 
secondary users. A static and dynamic game is simulated and compared and the 
inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium is explored. The major observations in this paper are 
that the spectrum sharing solution in case of the dynamic strategy adaptation depends on 
the given system parameters as well as the algorithmic parameters (e.g. learning rate) and 
the Nash Equilibrium does not necessarily maximise the total profit of the secondary 
users, however it does provide a fair solution, [40]. To expand on the concepts examined 
in [14], the same authors further investigate the inefficiency of the Nash Equilibrium as 
well as collusion and show collusion returns a higher profit than Nash Equilibrium by 
ensuring the primary services are aware of punishment due to deviation by properly 
weighting the profit in the future.  
 
A variation of the model is discussed in [44], where a Cournot game model is used to 
model the competition between secondary users for spectrum offered by the primary user. 
A static and dynamic game is modelled and simulated and shows the results that as the 
secondary user can achieve a higher transmission rate from adaptive modulation, higher 
profits can be achieved and hence secondary user prefers to have a larger spectrum size. 
A static model is used when all the secondary users are able to observe the strategies and 
payoffs of other secondary users, in the dynamic model, the secondary user adapts its 
spectrum sharing strategy by observing the marginal profit which is a function of 
spectrum price offered by the primary user.  
 
Alptekin and Bener  [17] have discussed in previous works a proposal for short-term sub-
lease of spectrum bands to different service providers and the optimum prices determined 
with use of a non-cooperative game.  
 
Chen, Zhang, Kuo proposed an adaptive cooperative spectrum-sharing model based on 
fairness and total profit in cognitive radio networks and demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the cooperative game in [4]. Salameh, Krunz and Younis performed a study on 
cooperative adaptive spectrum sharing to determine how the nodes in cognitive radio 
network cooperate to access the medium to maximise the cognitive radio network in [18]. 
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3.5 Regulations of Spectrum Trading/Sharing  
As radio spectrum is a major component of the infrastructure that fortifies the information 
society, an important issue in spectrum trading is policy and regulation, [33]. Spectrum 
regulations and policies define rules of cooperation between primary and secondary users. 
Due to the significance of the frequency spectrum to the economy, the use of spectrum is 
regulated by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). The 
management and development of the spectrum plays an important role in developing a 
knowledge-driven economy and society, [33] [34]. 
 
“The use of radio spectrum has become an integral part of society’s infrastructure” [34]. 
For decades, viewers have benefited from the reception of clear TV signals, travellers 
have relied upon assured communications and radio-location for aircraft, and all citizens 
have benefited from radio connectivity for the public safety services. Recently, the 
phenomenal growth in personal mobile communications has turned wireless access via 
mobile phones from a luxury to a necessity for many people, [33]. This growing demand 
for mobile and broadband communications is fuelling the demand for radio frequency 
spectrum licensing. As this demand increases, spectrum needs to be managed to avoid 
excessive interference between the different users, [33] [34]. 
 
This section provides an introduction to spectrum management, a discussion on spectrum 
management reform in South Africa as well as spectrum policy and regulation in South 
Africa.  The concluding subsection delves into on-going discussions in South Africa. 
3.5.1 Spectrum Management 
The concept of the radio spectrum regulation is known as spectrum management and has 
been practised around the world since the 1920’s, [33]. Spectrum management involves 
technical and regulatory mechanisms that are designed to achieve the optimal use of the 
radio frequency spectrum with the key purpose of maximising the value society gains 
from the radio spectrum. Earlier techniques of spectrum management may have been 
effective when utilising radio communication systems however due to the technological 
progress and innovative applications to utilise radio spectrum, the spectrum management 
process has become rather out-dated as it has not kept up with the major changes in 
technology, [33] [35]. 
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The two major components of spectrum management are the planning of spectrum 
(allocation of spectrum) and the licensing of spectrum users (assignment of frequency 
bands), [33]. The planning of spectrum bands is generally based on a clearly defined 
sharing criterion, whereas spectrum assignment follows from the planning component and 
is the detailed identification and coordination of the specific spectrum bands to individual 
users with specific technical conditions to avoid interference. These spectrum band plans 
are captured on regulations and are capable of enforcement, [33]. 
Figure 3-1: Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocations [33] 
Figure 3-1: Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocations [33] courtesy of Peter Zimri [33] 
shows the radio frequency spectrum allocations in South Africa as well as the channel 
arrangements, which is a detailed version of transmit and receive frequencies. Figure 3-2: 
Available Radio Spectrum [33] courtesy of Peter Zimri [33] shows the available radio 
frequency spectrum, where the “sweet spot” of the radio frequency spectrum is 
approximately from 380MHz to 1000MHz, which lies in the Ultra High Frequency 
(UHF) band.  
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Figure 3-2: Available Radio Spectrum [33] 
 The allocation of frequencies, as defined by International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), can be assigned in three ways, restricted frequency bands, open frequency bands 
and licenced frequency bands, [30].  Restricted frequency bands are exclusively reserved 
for radio astronomy; open frequency bands are allocated by the government and are free 
for use by anyone as long as they operate within transmit power limits and licensed 
frequency bands are allocated commercially at a cost and only licensed users may 
transmit within the allocated spectrum range, [30]. 
 
In South Africa, the spectrum management arrangements are a shared responsibility 
between the policy maker and the regulatory authority, i.e. the Department of 
Communication (DoC) coordinates spectrum for government services, while ICASA 
regulates all other spectrum requirements. The national government agencies, ICASA in 
the case of South Africa,  are typically responsible for allocation (type of services and 
technology deployed in the band) and assignment (entities granted licences to use the 
radio frequency bands) of the radio frequency spectrum as well as the role of 
administration and the harmonization of spectrum across borders, [33]. 
 
Currently, the spectrum management policy in South Africa is for ICASA to assign and 
allocate spectrum bands statically (known as “command-and-control”), which results in 
spectral under-utilisation, [30]. Furthermore, traditional regulatory policies of most 
countries like South Africa conform to the vertical layered model (sharing scheme 
between primary licensed users and secondary unlicensed users, where secondary users 
opportunistically exploit the licensed spectrum when the primary users are not active) 
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compared to the horizontal layered mode (sharing scheme between radio systems with 
equal regulatory priority, without causing interference and the operations of such radios 
can either be in the licensed or unlicensed frequency bands), [30]. 
 
To ensure that the interference between the different users remain manageable while 
allowing as many efficient users as possible, the spectrum regulator has the role of 
providing each user with the right to transmit on a particular frequency over a particular 
area, which is typically in the form of a license. “The right to access the spectrum (or 
license) is generally defined by frequency, space, transmit power, spectrum owner (i.e. 
licensee), type of use, and the duration of license” [27]. Usually, a license is allocated to 
one licensee, and the use of spectrum (assignment) by this licensee must conform to the 
specification in the license (e.g. maximum transmit power, location of base station, type 
of service assigned to this spectrum band). In the current spectrum licensing scheme, the 
license cannot change the type of use or transfer the right to other licensee, [27]. This 
limits the use of the frequency spectrum and results in low utilization of the frequency 
spectrum. With a low utilization of the frequency spectrum, the economic value derived 
from the spectrum is not maximised.  
 
The limitations in spectrum access due to the static spectrum licensing scheme can be 
summarized as follows: [27] 
 Fixed type of spectrum usage: The type of spectrum use cannot be changed; 
causing portions of the TV band could remain largely unused in many locations due 
to cable TV systems. 
 Licensed for a large region: When a spectrum is licensed, it is usually allocated to a 
particular user or wireless service provider in a large region (e.g. an entire city or 
state), however, the wireless service provider may use the spectrum only in areas 
with a good number of subscribers, to gain the highest return on investment. 
Consequently, the allocated frequency spectrum remains unused in other areas, and 
other users or service providers are prohibited from accessing this spectrum. 
 Large chunk of licensed spectrum: A wireless service provider is generally licensed 
with a large chunk of radio spectrum, for a service provider, it may not be possible 
to obtain license for a small spectrum band to use in a certain area for a short period 
of time to meet a temporary peak traffic load. 
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 Prohibit spectrum access by unlicensed users: Only a licensed user can access the 
corresponding radio spectrum and unlicensed users are prohibited from accessing 
the spectrum even though it is unoccupied by the licensed users. 
 
As the demand grows for spectrum, the regulator receives frequent requests for new 
spectrum as well as the allowance of existing users to change application, this as well as 
the current method of allocation and assignment is causing it to become increasingly 
difficult for the spectrum regulator to manage [36]. 
3.5.2 Spectrum Management Reform in South Africa 
“Traditional spectrum management practice is predicated on the spectrum being a 
limited resource that must be apportioned among uses and users by government 
administration” [37]. Spectrum management has not been able to keep up with the major 
changes in technology, business practice and economic policy and hence has led to 
growing technical and economic inefficiencies as well as obstacles to growing 
innovation.  These inefficiencies have provided a basis for spectrum management reform.  
Spectrum management reform offers low- and middle-income countries important new 
opportunities as well as challenges. 
 
In South Africa, spectrum management reform could be seen to have commenced in 1995 
when the DoC undertook a detailed spectrum investigation. As discussed in  [33] the 
recommendations from the investigation resulted in the first national spectrum allocation 
plan, the South African Band Re-Planning Exercise (SABRE-1), which covered spectrum 
allocations in the frequency range 20MHz to 3400MHz. SABRE-1 was followed up with 
SABRE-2 and resulted in the development of the South African Table of Frequency 
Allocations which included spectrum band allocations up to the 80GHz.  
 
The National Table of Frequency Allocations covering the frequency band from 9 kHz to 
3000 GHz was finalised by ICASA and the DoC in July 2010 following the publication of 
the radio frequency policy discussing the framework for management and planning of the 
spectrum in South Africa, [33]. ICASA then finalised the radio frequency spectrum fees 
regulations providing a bases for Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP) in March 2011, 
[33]. 
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 Table 1: Key events towards Spectrum Management Reform [33] 
Period  Documented Event  Spectrum Matter  
October, 1993  Independent Broadcasting 
Authority Act 153 of 1993  
Independent Institution Managing 
Broadcasting Spectrum  
August, 1995  Notice by P & T on SABRE  Invitation of the Development of the 
National Spectrum Allocation Plan  
November, 1996  Telecommunications Act 
(Act 103 of 1996)  
Spectrum Mandate awarded to the 
Authority  
April, 1997  Final South African Band 
Replanning Exercise 
(SABRE)  
Publication of Band Plan and Migration 
Strategy  
May, 1997  Amendment to SABRE  Inclusion of 3400 - 3600 MHz  
April, 1999  Broadcasting Act  Establishment of Frequency Spectrum 
Directorate MOC  
September, 1999  Feasibility Study into 
Common Public Safety 
System  
Licensing and award of spectrum 
available for a common Public safety 
network  
May, 2000  ICASA Act  Reform of the Regulators, IBA and 
SATRA  
August, 2001  SABRE 2  Covering Spectrum 3 to 70 GHz  
November, 2001  Telecommunications Act 
Amendment  
Award of 1800 and 3G spectrum to the 5 
Major Operators  
July, 2004  Final SATFA  Revision of frequency band Plan to 
consolidate SABRE 1 and 2 spectrum 
from 20 MHz to 70 GHz.  
December, 2005  Broadcasting Frequency 
Plan 2004  
Publication includes Spectrum for DTT  
April, 2006  Electronic Communications 
Act (Act 36 of 2005)  
Spectrum Mandate split between the DoC 
and ICASA  
May, 2005  Ministerial Task Team  Develop Digital Migration Report  
June, 2006  Regional 
Radiocommunication 
Conference  
GE-06 plan for Digital Terrestrial 
Broadcasting  
December, 2006  Policy Directions  Finalisation of the band plan till after 
2007  
September, 2007  World Radiocommunication 
Conference 2007 (WRC-07)  
ITU Spectrum Allocation for Mobile 
(IMT)  
September, 2008  Broadcasting Digital 
Migration Policy  
Transition Period to migrate from 
Analogue to Digital technologies  
2010  ICASA DTT Regulations  Allocation of Spectrum 
Channels/Multiplexers to incumbents  
July, 2010  South African Table of 
Frequency Allocations  
A revised band plan was published taking 
into account the Ministerial Policy 
directions  
April, 2010  Radio frequency spectrum 
Policy  
Seek to outline policy spectrum usage and 
processes  
June, 2010  ICASA amendment bill  Take away the frequency planning 
function from the Authority  
August, 2010  Radio frequency spectrum 
fees regulations for 
ECS/ECNS Licensees  
Ensure effective and efficient usage of 
spectrum through the administrative 
incentive pricing (AIP)  
September, 2010  Review of radio frequency 
spectrum regulations  
Consolidate all spectrum regulations to 
allow envisaged market based approach 
and trading and leasing of spectrum  
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Table 1 above provides a brief overview of the significant spectrum events in South 
Africa as highlighted by Peter Zimri in [33], as obtained from the policy maker, 
regulators and spectrum interest groups. 
 
In 2007 at the World Radiocommunications Conference, there was an ITU allocation of a 
790-862 MHz for mobile services on a primary basis. This led to what is known as the 
“digital dividend” [33]. In South Africa, the matter of how the regulatory framework and 
policy cater for the dividend and how it will be managed is pending with the Department 
of Communications, which delays the implementation of the digital migration. It is 
further delayed by finalization of the national frequency plan [33]. 
 
It is important to note that in September 2010, ICASA embarked on a public process to 
review the existing radio regulations established under the Post Office Act and Radio Act 
of 1952, these regulations aimed to introduce a market-based spectrum management 
approach as opposed to a command-and-control mechanism [33]. However, regulations 
were withdrawn in the final radio spectrum regulations. June 2010 saw the introduction of 
the ICASA Amendment Bill in Parliament, which pursued removing the spectrum 
planning functions from ICASA; however it has been withdrawn due to controversial 
issues within the Bill.  
 
“Despite these reforms, the problems of the delays from allocation of radio frequency 
spectrum bands to specific electronic communication services to the assignment or 
licensing of radio frequency channels to respective licensees have not been resolved” 
[33]. This is due to the introduction of new electronic communication technologies, 
inconsistent approaches employed between the policy maker and the authority and the 
lack of intelligence exhibited in allocating and assigning spectrum.  
3.5.3 Spectrum Management Policy and Regulatory Approaches 
There are three primary spectrum management regulatory models which are deployed 
globally, command-and-control (administrative), market-based or spectrum property 
rights and spectrum commons. These regulatory models are driven by the Government, 
market and technology respectively.  
 
In the command-and-control approach, also known as administrative, a centralised 
planning or command and control decision making system exists. In this approach the 
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state dictates what technology and applications are allocated for a range of radio 
frequency spectrum. To initially award spectrum licences in this approach, a beauty 
contest is held (“A beauty contest is a licensing process whereby a regulatory authority 
decides which firm’s financial, technical, and general services offerings are sound” 
[33]).  The spectrum management controlling body decides the duration of the spectrum 
usage which may include rollout obligations. In South Africa, this approach is still widely 
deployed and ICASA has endeavoured to attach rollout obligations for access to the 800 
MHz and 2.6 GHz spectrum bands in their latest spectrum migration proposal [33]. 
 
The Market-based or spectrum property rights approach is based on the introduction of 
property rights and can be characterised by three elements [33], i) well defined exclusive 
rights of the to the use of the spectrum, ii) a market-type primary assignment mechanism 
for the initial allocation of spectrum rights and iii) a secondary market in which these 
rights can be sold.  The main argument for the market-based approach is that it would 
dramatically increase the economic efficiency of spectrum use, however a consequence of 
putting all spectrum on the market would be, that so much spectrum might be freed that 
the price could drop close to zero,[37]. 
 
In South Africa, the recent debates tend to focus on the same ideas as Melody [33], such 
that the spectrum management regime fosters social and economic objectives. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, Melody reconsidered the spectrum debate and conveyed the 
adverse outcome of a third generation spectrum auction, the solution to this was to 
eradicate monopoly rents associated with scarce public resources (spectrum) by 
permitting innovative new entrants into the telecommunications market. ICASA has 
envisaged the design of the auction process for the licensing of the 2.6 GHz, 3.5 GHz and 
800 MHz that allows 450 holders of electronic communications network licences to 
compete fairly for the spectrum [33]. 
 
Another major driver in the spectrum debate is technological innovation, radio 
technologies now coming to market or under development allow for more efficient use 
and easier sharing of the spectrum and may render spectrum scarcity obsolete. This type 
of approach is known as the spectrum commons approach, [33]. In the spectrum 
commons model, radio frequency spectrum is allocated on a non-exclusive rights basis 
and the licensees and users can use this allocated spectrum unrestrained. This spectrum 
can be referred to as licence exempt frequency bands. Due to the uses of these frequency 
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bands, there are several rules that the users have to adhere too, such as restricted power 
levels to avoid interference to other services. Typical services supported in commons 
bands, [33], include remote control car locking mechanisms, microwave ovens, 
Bluetooth, etc. (all short-range devices). In South Africa, users are allowed to operate 
short-range devices in certain bands under specified power constraints and equipment 
type approval limitations; type approval is the certification of electronic communications 
equipment against an official standard. A general open access model is currently being 
proposed by ICASA and the DoC to implement bands for qualifying users and therefore 
manage the spectrum [33]. 
 
Replacement of spectrum management regimes and policy processes cannot be changed 
overnight as governments must consider spectrum requirements for its country’s safety 
and security and for scientific purposes [33]. 
3.5.3.1 Primary Spectrum Assignment Models 
The initial assignment of radio frequency channels is known as the primary assignment 
and will always be a function of government, irrespective of whether a spectrum 
management regulatory model is used. There are four mechanisms of primary 
assignment, namely [33] [39]: 
 First-come, first-served: The first-come, first served model is based on the 
principle that the right to use the spectrum is assigned to whichever user is first to 
apply and is characterised by when the demand is less than the supply, it is 
economically efficient if there is no scarcity, else incumbents dominate the 
airwaves. It has the benefit that its administrative method has a low transaction 
cost and it is a very simple process, on the other hand, the downsides are that it is 
largely subjective and the more efficient operators (with adequate information 
sources and resources) will have an advantage over a smaller operator.  
 Comparative Review (also known as ‘Beauty contest’): The beauty contest is the 
most common method of assigning spectrum and the applicant is required to 
provide detailed information that is then evaluated on the basis of a set of criteria. 
Deserving applicants will be scored or weighted on issues such as rapid rollout, 
viability of the network and its ability to manage competitive issues, which works 
for developed nations where processes are more transparent and well structured.  
This assignment model can be seen as subjective judgements and is not 
economically efficient.  
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 Lottery: In the lottery spectrum assignment model, spectrum is assigned to 
applicants at random. This method is intrinsically non-discriminatory and 
eliminates any competitive distortion. Although this model is quick and 
transparent, there are many disadvantages, such as there is a strong possibility that 
it could lead to ineffective award of spectrum and hence inefficient assignment of 
spectrum resources.  
 Auction: An auction is defined as “a market-transaction, conducted on the basis 
of explicit rules that allocates resources and determines a price by comparing the 
bids submitted by market participants”. An auction is the method of initially 
assigning the spectrum channels by a regulatory authority and regarded as a 
market-based approach to achieve maximum economic benefits from the 
resource. The types of auctions are discussed in section 2.5.4. 
 
In South Africa it is anticipated that the regulator will seek to use beauty contests or 
auctions or a hybrid methodology of the two, such assignments will only occur after an 
ITA has been issued by ICASA [38]. 
3.5.4 Spectrum Policy and Regulation in South Africa  
There are a scarce number of sources in the public domain that document spectrum 
management in South Africa [33], many of the publications focus on regulation 
development and engineering.  
 
Pre 1994, Telkom and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) performed 
the spectrum management function in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors 
respectively, spectrum management activities were then governed under the Radio ACT 
no3 of 1952, [33]. With the declaration of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
Act No 153 of 1993, the country saw the establishment of the first independent spectrum 
management function for broadcasting services; thereafter the South African 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) was established with the 
Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996, [33]. 
 
Spectrum management responsibility in South Africa is split between the DoC and 
ICASA, the policy maker and regulator respectively. With the intensified demand due to 
commencement of the digital terrestrial broadcasting migration process, controversies 
surfaced in 2006 causing the DoC to internationally agree on electronic communications 
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standards and a spectrum plan for digital broadcasting. Thereafter ICASA embarked on a 
similar process to develop the digital frequency plan [33]. 
 
Due to conflicts over responsibilities [33], the licensing of the high demand spectrum 
bands (800 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2.6 GHz and 3.5GHz) were impacted and hence delayed the 
roll-out of critical wireless broadband technologies. These delays impact the rolling out of 
new electronic communication networks and the provision of new services, which 
directly impacts the economy of the country due to limited access to the wireless 
broadband and the internet [33]. 
 
Despite the increased interest in spectrum management and the impact of wireless 
communications on universal access and services, there has been little research performed 
on the impact of the DoC and ICASA on the allocation and assignment of spectrum 
resources. It can be deducted that a split spectrum management scheme with a 
control-and-command mechanism creates inefficiencies from allocation to the award of 
spectrum assignments to licensees in South Africa [33]. 
 
Spectrum trading in South Africa is seen to be an illegal process that the regulatory 
framework and policy do not cater for. There is much discussion around this topic in 
South Africa and ICASA and the DoC have decided to further investigate if and how it 
should be implemented in South Africa as of April 2014. Spectrum bands are issued using 
administrative incentive pricing (AIP), where the bands are issued on a first-come first 
served basis which is coupled with a fee. The fee is based on value of the spectrum for a 
user with another service, additional costs if the service has to make use of other means 
and additional costs if the licensee uses less spectrum.  
3.5.5 Ongoing Discussions in South Africa 
The debate of unused spectrum in South Africa has been going on for many years as 
discussed in [19] by R Muller. Dominic Cull of Ellipsis Regulatory solutions agrees to the 
fact that spectrum trading should be allowed however with regulations to prevent 
profiteering and the spectrum broker model. The article [19] concludes that the market is 
not immediately excited about spectrum trading.  
 
There is also a debate on whether radio frequency spectrum is a natural resource and that 
it is not scarce. M Mueller [45] debates that it not a natural resource, nor is it scarce, it is 
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interference that gives rise to scarcity. This sentiment is further shared with others, who 
believe the spectrum scarcity is due to lack of knowledge when assigning and allocating 
spectrum resources [33].  
 
With regards to the use of TVWS for secondary users, there is a discussion on what 
secondary user market the TVWS can meet [41]. In 2013, a group of partners 
implemented a TVWS trial network covering ten schools in the Western Cape over a six 
month period during 2013. The trial partners include TENET, CSIR Meraka, e-Schools 
Network, WAPA and Google, with Comsol Wireless Solutions, Carlson Wireless 
Technologies and Neul as the vendor partners. The trial aimed at demonstrating TVWS 
can be used to deliver affordable broadband and Internet services without interfering 
with TV reception and increase awareness of the potential for TVWS technology in 
South Africa and across the continent. The trial [41] proved that TVWS can be used 
to access the Internet over long distances without causing interference; however the 
trial did not show how the cognitive radio scans the environment and avoid 
interference. It also omitted spectrum database and where the intelligence comes into 
the network.  
 
If the suggested market is the rural sector, the cost of erecting base station and 
electricity consumption needs to be calculated to determine if the benefits outweigh 
the costs and how these costs can be recovered. Also the benefits of using white 
spaces over 3G/4G or satellite technologies need to be identified.  
 
3.6 Socio-economic Impact of Spectrum Sharing 
“Spectrum trading can provide significant economic and social benefits only if they 
become widely available and they are utilized” [17]. The benefits currently derived from 
Television Whitespaces (TVWS) that was made possible through Dynamic Spectrum 
Access (DSA) has enhanced socio-economic development of the end-user through the 
provision of high-speed Internet access to its citizens [20]. The TVWS has also enhanced 
radio spectrum availability without any national or regional re-structuring of the current 
international radio spectrum allocation policy. Likewise, the flexibility involved in DSA 
permits a dynamic spectrum market where licensed owners can lease out their unused 
radio spectrum to generate revenue, not only provides more income for the licensed 
owners, but also enhances radio spectrum availability and its utilization. Furthermore, the 
 54 
 
lower entry costs provided by DSA has contributed to both product and business model 
lifecycles by enhancing production of more communication equipment and services as 
well as promoting more job opportunities. This increase in worldwide production as well 
as the provision of more job opportunities has positively impacted a number of nations’ 
GDP and worldwide economic growth in general. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter reviewed existing research work related to spectrum sharing, game theory 
models applied to spectrum sharing and economic models applied to spectrum sharing. A 
brief overview is provided on the socio-economic impact of spectrum sharing. 
 
The concluding subsections discuss telecommunication regulations, the regulatory 
environment and the issue of spectrum licensing, its usage and the importance of 
spectrum sharing as well as on-going discussions in South Africa. 
 
The following chapter presents a framework a theoretical framework of three pricing 
models, competitive pricing model, cooperative pricing model and market-equilibrium 
pricing model.  
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Chapter 4 
4 Theoretical Framework of Pricing Models 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an in-depth review of three different pricing models for spectrum 
price and each model encompasses different degrees of competition and cooperation 
among the primary service providers. The pricing models considered are market 
equilibrium, competitive pricing and cooperative pricing. A simple scenario is defined 
where each pricing model algorithm can be separately applied, given the same conditions 
and assumptions.  
 
The system considered is adapted from [27] where secondary users can opportunistically 
exploit the wireless spectrum licensed to primary users.  It can be assumed that the 
secondary users can intelligently make decisions on the approach to adopt in accessing 
the spectrum. Figure 4-1 adapted from [27] illustrates the basic system design of 
spectrum sharing between the primary and secondary users. There are N licensed service 
providers that are said to service the licensed primary service users. Each service 
provider, i, serves    primary users. The service providers can then sell underutilized 
portions of its spectrum to secondary users at a price (spectrum price). The spectrum price 
(per unit spectrum) is denoted,   .  
 
Figure 4-1: Illustration of spectrum trading [27] 
It is assumed that the spectrum sharing between the primary and secondary users is 
performed on a time-division multiple access (TDMA) based wireless-access scheme, 
such that the primary users sell time slots in the licensed spectrum to the secondary users.  
 
The spectrum demand of the secondary users is dependent on the transmission rate 
achieved on the allocated frequency spectrum and the price charged by the licensed 
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service providers. As both the primary and secondary users use adaptive modulation, the 
transmission rate can be dynamically adjusted by the channel quality [27]. The spectral 
efficiency (   of a Gaussian channel is given by, 
                      
   
              
                              
where   is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and        is the target bit-error-rate (BER). 
  
   
 is used to represent the spectral efficiency of wireless transmission by secondary 
users, whereas   
   
represents the spectral efficiency of wireless transmission by primary 
users, both for primary service     
 
The profit of a primary service provider depends not only on the cost of sharing the 
spectrum with the secondary service providers (e.g. due to performance degradation of 
primary users), but also on the strategy chosen by other primary service providers. The 
price,   , can be set by three different pricing strategies, namely market-equilibrium, 
competitive and cooperative pricing models and this is shown in section 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 
respectively. These different pricing strategies result in different behaviors of the firms in 
achieving the best and stable decisions. 
 
For the purpose of this research report, a duopoly is considered, therefore there are only 
two primary services each servicing a number of primary users and a group of secondary 
users. The application of these pricing models extend beyond two-user games, however 
the assumptions, derivations and submissions here can be generalized to multi-user 
scenarios.  
4.2 Utility and Spectrum Demand of the Secondary Users 
To quantify the satisfaction of spectrum access by secondary users, a utility function is 
given by Equation (28), where ( ̅) indicates the payoff for each value of bandwidth in 
the vector,  ̅ . [31] 
 ( ̅)   ∑    
     
 
 
(∑  
    ∑    
   
 
   
)  ∑    
 
   
                          
 
   
     
where   is a vector of shared spectrum sizes from all the primary services,    is the price 
offered by primary service provider   and   is the total number of primary service 
providers. The quality of the spectrum is taken into account by the spectral efficiency, 
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 and   denotes the spectrum substitutability. Spectrum substitutability indicates the 
ability of a secondary user to be able to switch among the frequency spectra depending on 
the price offered by the primary service providers. The spectrum substitutability factor is 
defined as, when      , a secondary cannot switch among the frequency spectra, 
whereas when      , a secondary can openly switch among the frequency spectra.  
 
To obtain the demand function for spectrum from the primary service provider    the 
utility function is to be differentiated with respect to    (spectrum sizes for primary 
service provider,  ) to determine a partial solution. Therefore, the demand (    ̅ ) for 
primary service provider,    is represented by, 
    ̅   
     
   
   
(  
      )             ∑    
          
               
            
where   is a vector of prices offered by all the primary service providers in the market. 
The demand function can be simplified to                    , where     denotes 
the vector of prices of all primary services except service  .         and      are both 
constants for given    for     and are given by, [27] 
        
  
               ∑    
          
               
                                    
   
          
               
                                                               
4.3 Revenue and Cost functions for a Primary Service Provider 
If spectrum trading is allowed on the network, a primary service provider has two sources 
of revenue, the primary service users and the secondary users. Although spectrum trading 
can generate higher revenue to the primary service provider by selling spectrum to 
secondary users, it comes at the cost of degraded QoS performance on the primary users. 
This is due to interference caused by secondary users sharing the radio spectrum with 
primary users. The degraded QoS to the primary users causes a loss to the primary service 
provider in the form of a cost discount.  
 
For the purpose of this research report, it is assumed that the primary users are charged a 
flat rate for a guaranteed amount of bandwidth, if this required bandwidth cannot be 
provided, a discount is offered to the primary users. 
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The revenue gained from primary users served by primary service   (  
   is given by, 
  
                                                                                 
where    denotes a constant weight for the revenue and the revenue gained from sharing 
spectrum with secondary users (  
   is given by, 
  
                                                                                  
where    represents the spectrum size shared with the secondary users and    the 
corresponding price per unit of spectrum.  
 
The cost discount (        given to primary users is given by, 
           (  
   
   
        
  
)
 
                                    
where    denotes a constant weight for the cost functions at the primary service. The 
bandwidth requirement per user is denoted by   
   
, the spectrum size is denoted by   
and the number of on-going primary users serviced by primary service   is denoted by  . 
 
It can be seen that given the revenue from the primary users is a linear function of the 
number of on-going users, whereas the revenue from the secondary users is a linear 
function of the shared spectrum size, given the spectrum price. “The cost is proportional 
to the square of the difference between the bandwidth requirement and allocated 
bandwidth to a primary user” [31]. 
4.4 Market-Equilibrium Pricing Strategy 
In the market-equilibrium strategy, it is assumed that the primary service provider is not 
aware of any others and hence there is no competition or cooperation and the spectrum 
price is set naively based on spectrum demand from the secondary users (demand 
function) [27]. The price is set based on the willingness of the primary service provider to 
sell spectrum and this is determined by the supply function. The supply function indicates 
the size of radio spectrum shared by a primary user with the secondary user, whereas the 
demand function indicates the size of radio spectrum required by secondary users [27]. 
 
Given the price per unit of spectrum,    the spectrum supply function will indicate the 
size of the spectrum to be sold by the primary service provider and this spectrum supply 
function can be derived based on a profit maximisation problem. “The solution of this 
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optimization formulation is the optimal spectrum size,    to be shared with the secondary 
users” [27]. 
 
Based on equations (32), (33) and (34), the profit (  ) of primary service provider i for 
owned spectrum  , can be expressed by, 
                   (  
   
   
        
  
)
 
                             
The optimal spectrum size can be determined by differentiating the profit function (  ) 
with respect to   , 
   
   
            (  
   
   
        
  
)
  
   
  
                          
Therefore the optimal value of   
  gives the supply function (    as, 
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From equation (5) (page 23), the market-equilibrium is defined as the price,   
  at which 
the spectrum supply function equals the spectrum demand function, 
     
        
                                                                     
where    is a vector consisting of the market-equilibrium prices for all service providers. 
 
As a primary service provider is unaware of the existence of other primary service 
providers, it can be seen that the supply function is independent of the prices offered by 
other primary service providers.[27]. 
4.4.1 Algorithm for Market-Equilibrium Pricing Strategy 
1. Initialisation: Primary service provider  , where           
2. Determine the demand: Using the demand function (29), find the demand for each 
primary service providers’ set price,    
3. Determine the revenue and cost functions: Using the revenue (32) and (33) and 
cost functions (34), calculate the revenue and cost discount for each primary 
service providers’ set price,    with the bandwidth requirement for each of the 
primary users.  
4. Calculate the profit: Using the  profit function (35), calculate the profit for each 
primary service providers’ at set price,    
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5. Derive supply function: Determine the supply function (37) by taking the 
derivative of the profit function (35). The supply function represents the supply of 
services for each set price assigned by the primary service provider.  
6. Determine equilibrium price where the supply function is equal to the demand 
function: Solve the function where supply is equal to demand (38) simultaneously 
to obtain the price at equilibrium. This price is the best strategy for market-
equilibrium.  
7. Confirmation: Confirm if this equilibrium price is the best strategy to ensure there 
is no excess supply.  
4.5 Competitive Pricing Strategy 
In the competitive pricing model, each of the primary service providers is aware of the 
competition amongst each other and each of the primary service providers aim to 
maximise their own profit [27]. The primary service providers compete through price 
adjustment, i.e. given the spectrum prices offered by other primary service providers, one 
primary service provider will choose the price for its own spectrum such that its 
individual profit is maximised [27]. 
 
To model the competition for price among the primary service providers, a non-
cooperative game model is used where the players (sellers in an oligopoly market) are the 
primary service providers, the strategy of each player is the price offered by unit of 
spectrum (non-negative) and the payoff for each player is the individual profit due to 
spectrum trading under competition to the secondary users [27]. 
 
The profit (    for each primary service provider, i, can be expressed by, 
         
     
                                                              
where   is a vector containing all the prices offered per unit of spectrum and   
    
     as 
defined in equations (32), (33) and (34) [27]. 
 
The solution of this game is Nash Equilibrium and this can be obtained by using the best 
response function (    of the players, which is the best strategy of one player given the 
other’s strategies. The best response function of primary service provider    given a set of 
prices offered by all other primary services (   ) is defined by, 
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The Nash equilibrium of this game is denoted by the set    if and only if, 
           
                                                                 
where    
  denotes a vector of best responses for player   and    . To obtain this Nash 
equilibrium, the derivative of the profit is required with respect to    and setting this to 
zero, to obtain the price at Nash equilibrium (i.e. 
   
   
      ) [27]. 
 
In the competitive pricing strategy, the size of the shared bandwidth,   , in the profit 
function (    can be replaced with the spectrum demand,       (Equation (29), page 57). 
Therefore the profit function can be expressed as, 
                         (  
   
   
           
  
)
 
            
To obtain Nash equilibrium solve equation (22) for   
 , 
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)                       
where              is per equation (30) and (31). Once the price at Nash equilibrium 
is found, it can be substituted into     
   to obtain the size of the shared spectrum. 
 
For the special case of two primary service providers (           ), equation (43) 
can be represented by equations (44) and (45). [40] 
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By solving equations (44) and (45) simultaneously, the price at Nash equilibrium,   , can 
be determined for each primary service provider.  
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4.5.1 Algorithm for Competitive Pricing Strategy 
1. Initialisation: Primary service provider  , where           
2. Determine the demand: Using the demand function (29), find the demand for each 
primary service providers’ set price,    
3. Determine the revenue and cost functions: Using the revenue (32) and 33) and 
cost functions (34), calculate the revenue and cost discount for each primary 
service providers’ set price,    with the bandwidth requirement for each of the 
primary users.  
4. Calculate the profit: Using the  profit function (42), calculate the profit for each 
primary service providers’ at set price,    
5. Solve for Nash Equilibrium: Solve the derivative of the profit (43) for the special 
case of two primary service providers,   
  and    
 . These prices are the best 
strategy for Nash-equilibrium 
6. Determine the profit at equilibrium: Use   
  and   
  as found in 5 in the profit 
function (42) to determine the profit attained at Nash-equilibrium 
7. Confirmation: Confirm if this equilibrium price is the best strategy to maximise 
one players profit given the other players strategies.  
4.6 Cooperative Pricing Strategy 
In the cooperative pricing model, the primary service providers collude with each other to 
attain the highest total profit by selling spectrum to secondary users. All the service 
providers are aware of each other and fully cooperate with each other.  
 
To model the cooperative pricing strategy, an optimization problem is formulated where 
the highest profit can be achieved through an optimal price. The problem can be 
formulated by, 
          ∑                    
 
   
                                            
                                                                        
                                                                    
where equation (46) is the total profit for all the primary service providers and if    is 
replaced by      , the Lagrangian (      is represented by, 
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where              are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in equation (47) and (48) 
respectively. With the use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, the vector of 
optimal prices,    can be obtained such that to maximise the total profit of all the primary 
service providers. [27] 
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing 
strategy in theoretical details. Both algorithms are applied to a simple scenario, given the 
same conditions and assumptions and a number of test conditions are applied. 
 
Both the market-equilibrium pricing and competitive pricing strategies have been 
explained in detail and the mathematical frameworks have been presented. A step by step 
description of a generalised operational procedure for each scheme is presented. The 
concluding subsections describe the third pricing strategy, cooperative pricing strategy.  
 
The methodology to implement the framework discussed in this chapter as well as the 
simulation results are discussed in the ensuing chapter. The next chapter also provides an 
analysis of spectrum trading regulations and policy in South Africa and the key findings 
from the simulation results and interview sessions.  
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Chapter 5 
5 Methodology, Simulation Results and Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the methodology and simulation results for two pricing strategies, 
namely the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing strategy as 
well as the methodology and findings from in depth interviews. The second section 
defines the approaches adopted, the scenarios set-up (test-cases), the assumptions made 
and the methods used. The third section presents comprehensive simulation results 
derived from using MATLAB to simulate the two pricing strategies. The properties and 
performance of the two pricing strategies, based on the two different simulation results, 
are then compared and analysed in the next section. The concluding sections discuss the 
research methodology and findings for the regulatory component of this research report.  
 
5.2 Methodology for the Simulation of the Pricing Models 
The formulation of the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing 
strategy were performed using the step-by-step approach, as outlined in Chapter 4. The 
simulations were conducted in two phases using MATLAB software. In the first phase, 
the market-equilibrium pricing strategy was simulated and results were derived. In the 
second phase, the competitive pricing strategy was simulated. The two phases of the 
simulations are explained in detail below. 
5.2.1 Market-Equilibrium Pricing Strategy 
The simulation for the market-equilibrium pricing strategy is set up in MATLAB, 
according to the procedure outlined in the flow chart in Figure 5-1 . The simulation is 
based on two primary services offering spectrum to group of secondary users while each 
primary service services a fixed number of primary users. Each primary service has a set 
total frequency spectrum available to them. The following outlines all parameters and 
assumptions used for the simulation. 
1. Initialisation: The number of primary services is set to two (     ). The total 
frequency spectrum available to each primary service is 20 MHz (       ). 
Each primary service serves 10 primary users (           ). The target Bit-
Error-Rate (BER) for the secondary users is              . The bandwidth 
requirement of each of the primary users is 2 Mbps (   
      . The 
 65 
 
constants        and         (where    is the constant weight for the revenue 
earned by primary users, and    is the constant weight for the cost discount, these 
are chosen as per [31]). The channel quality for secondary users can vary between 
9 and 22 dB and is initialised to 9 dB. The spectrum substitutability,   is set at 
0.7. The price offered by each primary service,    and   , are both varied from 1.0 
to 2.0 in increments of 0.1.    forms the outer loop for the calculations, while    
forms the inner loop. 
2. Determine the demand: Using the demand function (29), find the demand for each 
primary service providers’ set price,   . The demand is based on both    and   . 
Firstly the values for spectral efficiency,  , and sum function in the demand, 
∑    
           are calculated.  
3. Determine the revenue and cost functions: Using the revenue (32) and (33) and 
cost functions (34), calculate the revenue and cost discount for each primary 
service providers’ set price,   and    with the bandwidth requirement for each of 
the primary users.  
4. Calculate the profit: Using the profit function (35), calculate the profit for each 
primary service providers’ at set price,    and    for Market Equilibrium.  
5. Derive supply function: Determine the supply function (37) by taking the 
derivative of the profit function (35). The supply function represents the supply of 
services for each set price assigned by the primary service provider.  
6. Determine equilibrium price where the supply function is equal to the demand 
function: Solve the function where supply is equal to demand (38) simultaneously 
to obtain the price at equilibrium. This is done graphically in the simulation and is 
indicated by the point where the supply function crosses the demand function. 
This price is the best strategy at market-equilibrium.  
7. Confirmation: Confirm there is a Market-Equilibrium price and that it is the best 
strategy to ensure there is no excess supply for varying values of price and the 
bandwidth requirement of each of the primary users.  
 
 66 
  
Initialise user 𝑖 
Set 𝑁    , 𝑊𝑖    , 𝑀    𝑀      , 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟         𝐵𝑖
𝑟𝑒𝑞   , 𝑐      and 𝑐   
   , 𝑆𝑁𝑅    , 𝑣      . Calculate 𝑘  
Set 𝑝𝑗 to increment from 1.0 to 1.8 
Set 𝑝𝑖  to increment from 1.0 to 1.8 
Calculate, ∑  𝑘𝑖
 𝑠  𝑝𝑗 𝑖 𝑗  
Calculate 𝒟𝑖,𝒟 , 𝒟  
Calculate 𝑖
𝑙, 𝑖
𝑠, 𝒞𝑖 
Calculate 𝒫𝑖  
Calculate 𝒮𝑖 
Compare 𝒮𝑖 and  𝒟𝑖 
Set 𝑝𝑖
  𝑝𝑖   and 
𝑝𝑗
  𝑝𝑗  
𝒮𝑖 =  𝒟𝑖 
Store values for 𝒮𝑖 and  𝒟𝑖 for 
each iteration 
Plot 𝒮𝑖 and  𝒟𝑖 for each 𝑝𝑗 
End 
For N=2 
Figure 5-1: Flow-chart of the market-equilibrium pricing algorithm 
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5.2.2 Competitive Pricing Strategy 
The simulation for the competitive pricing strategy is set up in MATLAB, according to 
the procedure outlined in the flow chart in Figure 5-2. The simulation is based on two 
primary services offering spectrum to group of secondary users while each primary 
service services a fixed number of primary users. Each primary service has a set total 
frequency spectrum available to them. The following outlines all parameters and 
assumptions used for the simulation. 
1. Initialisation: The number of primary services is set to two (     ). The total 
frequency spectrum available to each primary service is 20 MHz (       ). 
Each primary service serves 10 primary users (           ). The target Bit-
Error-Rate (BER) for the secondary users is              . The bandwidth 
requirement of each of the primary users is 2 Mbps (  
      . The constants 
       and         (where    is the constant weight for the revenue earned by 
primary users, and    is the constant weight for the cost discount, these are 
chosen as per [31]). The channel quality for secondary users can vary between 9 
and 22 dB and is initialised to 9 dB. The spectrum substitutability,   is set at 0.7. 
The price offered by each primary service,    and   , are both varied from 1.0 to 
2.0 in increments of 0.1.    forms the outer loop for the calculations, while    
forms the inner loop. 
2. Determine the demand: Using the demand function (29), find the demand for each 
primary service providers’ set price,   . The demand is based on both    and   . 
Firstly the values for spectral efficiency,    and sum function in the demand, 
∑    
           are calculated. 
3. Determine the revenue and cost functions: Using the revenue (32) and (33) and 
cost functions (34), calculate the revenue and cost discount for each primary 
service providers’ set price,   and    with the bandwidth requirement for each of 
the primary users.  
4. Calculate the profit: Using the  profit function (42), calculate the profit for each 
primary service providers’ at set price,    and    using the demand function for 
each set price,    and    
5. Solve for Nash Equilibrium: Solve the derivative of the profit (43) for the special 
case of two primary service providers,   
  and    
 . Solve the equations 
simultaneously to get   
  and   
 , this can be seen graphically from the highest 
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point of the competitive profit curve (42).  These prices are the best strategy for 
Nash-equilibrium 
6. Determine the profit at equilibrium: Use   
  and   
  as found in 5 in the profit 
function (42) to determine the profit attained at Nash-equilibrium 
7. Confirmation: Confirm if this equilibrium price is the best strategy to maximise 
one players profit given the other players strategies. The profit attained by each 
primary service can be compared at each iteration for the given set of prices,    
and   . 
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Initialise user i 
Set 𝑁    , 𝑊𝑖    , 𝑀    𝑀      , 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟         𝐵𝑖
𝑟𝑒𝑞   , 
𝑐      and 𝑐      , 𝑆𝑁𝑅    , 𝑣      . Calculate 𝑘. 
Set 𝑝𝑗 to increment from 1.0 to 1.8 
Set 𝑝𝑖  to increment from 1.0 to 1.8 
Calculate, ∑  𝑘𝑖
 𝑠  𝑝𝑗 𝑖 𝑗  
Calculate 𝒟𝑖,𝒟 , 𝒟  
Calculate 𝑖
𝑙, 𝑖
𝑠, 𝒞𝑖 
Calculate 𝒫𝑖  
Solve for 𝑝𝑖
  and 𝑝𝑗
  simultaneously 
Calculate profit and demand at Nash 
equilibrium 
Store values for 𝒫𝑖, 𝒫𝑖
  and 
 𝒟𝑖 for each iteration 
Plot  𝒫𝑖 for each 𝑝𝑗 
End 
For N=2 
Figure 5-2: Flow-chart of the competitive pricing algorithm 
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5.3 Test cases 
To test the performance of the pricing strategies, the following test cases are used. Each 
test case requires a variation of the initial parameters. 
5.3.1 Efficiency of the pricing strategies  
The total profit of both primary services achieved with market-equilibrium pricing and 
competitive pricing is shown with varying rates of the bandwidth requirement for each of 
the primary users.   
5.3.2 Existence of pricing solutions 
The existence of pricing solutions is shown by varying the value of the bandwidth 
requirement for each of the primary users, and plotting demand and supply functions for 
the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the best responses for the competitive pricing 
strategies to determine the if there is a market-equilibrium and Nash equilibrium 
respectively. The best response of one primary service is a linear function of price offered 
by the other primary service (40). The market-equilibrium is the point where the spectrum 
supply and spectrum demand curves meet and Nash-equilibrium is at the point where the 
best response functions intersect.  
5.3.3 Variations of primary services profit with offered price  
By varying the price offered by primary service one and two, the relationship of the profit 
to the price can be determined.  
5.3.4 Variations of profit under different channel qualities 
By varying the channel qualities, the relationship between the channel quality and the 
profit of primary service 1 and 2 can be determined as well as the relationship between 
the demand for primary service 1 and 2 under different channel qualities.  
5.3.5 Impact of spectrum substitutability factor 
By varying the channel qualities, the relationship between the substitutability factor and 
the profit of primary service 1 and 2 can be determined as well as the relationship 
between the demand for primary service 1 and 2 under different substitutability factor.  
 
5.4 Simulation Results 
This section details the computer simulation results of the two pricing strategies, market-
equilibrium and competitive. 
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5.4.1 Efficiency of the pricing strategies  
Figure 5-6, Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8 shows the total profit achieved for both pricing models, 
competitive pricing model and market-equilibrium pricing model, for varying rates of the 
bandwidth requirement for each of the primary users. 
 
Figure 5-3: The total profit for both pricing strategies with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 2 
Mbps 
 
Figure 5-4: The total profit for both pricing strategies with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 3 
Mbps 
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Figure 5-5: The total profit for both pricing strategies with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 4 
Mbps 
It can be seen the higher the bandwidth requirement for each of the primary users, the 
higher the revenue earned from the competitive pricing model, alternatively, the revenue 
earned from market-equilibrium pricing model decreases as the bandwidth requirement 
for each of the primary users increases.  
5.4.2 Existence of pricing solutions 
Figure 5-6, Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9 shows the effect on the market-
equilibrium point for varying values of   
   
, the bandwidth requirement for each of the 
primary users. The scenario shows the effect of on primary service one, with a fixed 
offered price for primary service two and a varying offered price for primary service two.  
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Figure 5-6: The spectrum supply and demand functions for a varying price offered by primary service 
provider 1 and the price offered by primary service provider 2 set to 2 
 
Figure 5-7: The spectrum supply and demand functions for a varying price offered by primary service 
provider 1 and the price offered by primary service provider 2 set to 4 
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Figure 5-8: The spectrum supply and demand functions for a varying price offered by primary service 
provider 1 and the price offered by primary service provider 2 set to 6 
 
Figure 5-9: The spectrum supply and demand functions for a varying price offered by primary service 
provider  1 and the price offered by primary service provider 2 set to 8 
It can be seen that as the bandwidth requirement of each of the primary users increases, 
the spectrum supply decreases and as the offered price for primary service one increases, 
so does the spectrum supply. Spectrum demand on the other hand is a decreasing function 
of offered price. These figures show that spectrum supply depends largely on the number 
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of primary users and their bandwidth requirements. The market-equilibrium point is 
located at the point where the spectrum demand meets the spectrum supply; it is observed 
that market-equilibrium exists only for certain values of offered prices and certain ranges 
of bandwidth requirement (  
   
). 
 
For the competitive pricing model, the best responses were determined by the best 
response function, which is a linear representation of price offered by the other primary 
service. Figure 5-10, Figure 5-11 and Figure 5-12 shows the existence of Nash 
equilibrium is dependent on the number of primary users and their bandwidth 
requirements and only exists for certain ranges of bandwidth requirement and offered 
prices.  
 
As the profit of primary service two increases, the profit of primary service one 
decreases, this is due to the effect of the offered price on the demand. If the price is too 
low, spectrum demand from the secondary service becomes high and the performance of 
the primary service degrades (causing a loss of profit due to the cost discount), however 
as profit from selling spectrum to secondary users is higher than the cost discount due to 
the performance degradation and the profit of the service increases. If the price is too 
high, the demand for bandwidth becomes low and the profit decreases [31]. 
 
Figure 5-10: The best response functions for a fixed price offered by both primary service providers 
respectively with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 2 
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Figure 5-11: The best response functions for a fixed price offered by both primary service providers 
respectively with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 4 
 
Figure 5-12: The best response functions for a fixed price offered by both primary service providers 
respectively with the bandwidth requirement per user set to 10 
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It can be seen that optimal values for the prices offered by primary service provider 1 and 
2 are when they are the same. This way, both primary service providers earn the same 
revenue. 
5.4.3 Variations of primary services profit with offered price  
The effects on the profit of primary service one by varying the offered prices for primary 
service one and two are shown in Figure 5-13 below, where    is the price offered for 
primary service one, and    is the price offered to primary service two. The maximum 
profit attained for primary service one is at the highest point of the curve.  
 
Figure 5-13: The profit of primary service 1 for a varying price offered by both primary service providers 
As the offered price for primary service one increases, the cost due to the QoS 
degradation to the primary user’s increases, resulting in a negative profit for one primary 
service. It can be seen that as the offered price increases, the profit increases to a point 
until the demand from secondary users decreases causing the profit to decrease. The point 
of the highest profit is known as the best response 
5.4.4 Variations of profit under different channel qualities 
Figure 5-14, Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16 below show the effect of a varying channel 
quality on the profit in a market-equilibrium pricing strategy of primary service one with 
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a set offered price. It can be seen that profit is a decreasing function of SNR and does not 
change with the offered price.  
 
Figure 5-14: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [1 1]  
 
Figure 5-15: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [1 8]  
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Figure 5-16: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [8 1]  
Figure 5-17, Figure 5-18 and Figure 5-19 below show the effect of a varying channel 
quality on the profit in a competitive pricing strategy of primary service one with a set 
offered price. 
 
Figure 5-17: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [1 1]  
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Figure 5-18: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [1 8]  
 
Figure 5-19: The profit of primary service provider 1 for a varying SNR and offered prices set to [8 1]  
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It can be seen that as the SNR increases, the profit decreases except for when there is a 
large difference between the offered prices, the profit increases until the point where the 
demand decreases. As the SNR increases, the demand increases but due to the set price in 
Figure 5-18 and Figure 5-19, the secondary users would rather buy the service from 
primary service two, hence causing a decrease in profit for primary service one.  
5.4.5 Impact of spectrum substitutability factor 
The spectrum substitutability,   is where,    , a secondary user cannot switch among 
the frequency spectra, while for    , a secondary user can switch among the operating 
frequency spectra freely. Figure 5-20, Figure 5-21 and Figure 5-22 shows the effect on 
profit of primary service one by varying v with a set offered price for primary service 
two. It can be seen that       provides the most flexibility and allows secondary users 
to switch between operating frequencies freely showing that as the offered price for 
service one becomes too high, the secondary user would rather move to primary service 
two, causing a decrease in profit for primary service one.  
 
Figure 5-20: The profit of primary service provider 1 for varying spectrum substitutability and offered 
price by service provider 1 with the offered price of service provider 2set to 2   
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Figure 5-21: The profit of primary service provider 1 for varying spectrum substitutability and offered 
price by service provider 1 with the offered price of service provider 2 set to 4   
 
Figure 5-22: The profit of primary service provider 1 for varying spectrum substitutability and offered 
price by service provider 1 with the offered price of service provider 2 set to 8 
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5.4.6 Analysis of Simulation Results 
From the simulations it can be seen that when comparing the competitive and market-
equilibrium pricing models, at equilibrium, the competitive pricing model earns a higher 
revenue than the market-equilibrium. For the case of the market-equilibrium pricing 
model spectrum supply depends largely on the number of primary users and their 
bandwidth requirements and that market-equilibrium exists only for certain values of 
offered prices and certain ranges of bandwidth requirement. For the case of the 
competitive pricing model the optimal values for the prices offered by primary service 
provider 1 and 2 are when they are the same, this way, both primary service providers 
earn the same revenue, if one price is lower. The competitive pricing model exists when 
the bandwidth requirement is neither too high nor too low and is dependent on the 
number of primary users and their bandwidth requirements. In the competitive model, the 
offered price increases the profit increases to a point until the demand from secondary 
users decreases causing the profit to decrease, this is due to the cost discount offered to 
primary users which causes a loss of revenue.  
 
The varying channel quality has no effect on the revenue earned with a market-
equilibrium pricing model, however in the competitive pricing model; the varying SNR 
varies the demand, hence changing the profit. From the simulations,       provides the 
most flexibility and allows secondary users to switch between operating frequencies 
freely showing that as the offered price for service one becomes too high, the secondary 
user would rather move to primary service two, causing a decrease in profit for primary 
service one. 
 
5.5 Methodology for Analysis of Spectrum Trading Regulations and 
Policy  
As spectrum management is seen as a specialised field worldwide, it is often neglected in 
developing countries as these countries only participate in International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) World Radiocommunication Conferences’ (WRC) at a 
very high level [33]. In South Africa, the research in the spectrum management field is 
limited to a few discussion papers and opinions and the spectrum management roles 
appear to be a combination of institutional arrangements that exist elsewhere.  
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Due to the limited available documentation, the data collected is performed through 
document analysis of material that could be obtained through one-on-one interviews with 
decision makers of the regulator, policy maker and the entities listed in Appendix A 
which have been purposely selected for this research and may not be in the public 
domain. The interviewees were presented in advance with the questionnaire in Appendix 
B. The reviews of published and internal records and reports from regulators and policy 
makers as discussed by Peter Zimri in [33] are made reference too and discussed.  
 
The interviewees were selected, due to their expertise in the field of spectrum 
management and the organisation they represented as major spectrum holders [33]. It 
should be noted that a few individuals directly involved in spectrum management within 
in the Regulator, the Policy maker and licensees have turned down interviews and the 
questionnaire. Interview candidates highlighted the sensitivities around both spectrum 
decisions and potential license applications, which may have compromised them 
personally and the organisations they represent. The interviews took place around 
12/2013 and 01/2014.  
 
5.6 Findings on Spectrum Trading Regulatory Approaches 
The findings in this section are from analysis of relevant documentation and interviews 
with key informants. According to the all the interviewees [46][47][48][50] the market 
would be welcoming to sharing underutilised white spaces in spectrum with secondary 
users provided it does not cause interference, if there is interference, this would cause 
degraded service resulting in a lower revenue as well as unsatisfied customers and the 
main aim of the operator  is to provide a guaranteed QoS.  
 
The behaviour of the market if spectrum trading were allowed would be reflective on the 
market, as South Africa is not a mature market, the operators would act competitively to 
outdo the other operators and earn the most revenue based on the Competition Act in 
South Africa [46]. As spectrum is seen as a scarce resource due to the current spectrum 
assignment model, any operator with spectrum can have a monopoly over the 
underutilised spectrum in the band and the more important this band is the higher 
competition for it to be traded [47]. 
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If operators cooperate with one another, jointly they can earn more revenue, however this 
is dependent on the market and the operators, it is believed that it is possible that the 
primary service providers would cooperate with the smaller role players, however the 
larger operators could try to eliminate the smaller role players from the market. [48] It is 
also believed every business would need to make a profit and the Competition Act and 
ICASA will ensure this is carried out fairly [46]. In the future, when the market matures, 
cooperation can be a viable option.  
 
As operators pay very high rates for the spectrum licenses, they agree 
[46][47][48][49][50][51] it cannot be given to secondary users for free and this would 
distort their economic model. On the other hand, for the market with no spectrum, this 
would be a positive response.  
 
In terms of considering methods of assigning spectrum, the regulator is considering a 
beauty contest with a closed bid auction [46]. Some operators [47] [48] feel auctioning 
could work well however the adverse effect could be that you end up paying more for 
spectrum than it is actually worth. It is good to include a social responsibility segment 
that the bidders need to submit in their applications.  
 
The market considered for spectrum trading could include provision of backhaul links, 
rural sectors and point to multipoint sites for access networks [49][50]. In rural areas, 
operators [46][47][48] agree it would be good to provision limited free services as the 
economy is taking strain on what it can afford, however at the same time building 
network in rural areas come at a high cost and returns on these investments need to be 
recovered. These services to such areas can be offered as a premium service with reduced 
rates however a detailed market research will need to be carried out.  
 
The suggested bands for this service are the freed up spectrum after the digital migration, 
700 MHz and 800 MHz as well as the 2.6 GHz band [46][47][48]. It is imperative 
spectrum management is technology agnostic however the economy of scale of devices 
also need to be taken into account, e.g. devices are usually built supporting specific 
spectrum bands and if the TVWS is to be utilised, the devices will only be available in the 
future [50]. 
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If the underutilised spectrum is part of the frequency spectrum that the operator could use 
to provide additional services, then they would buy back the additional spectrum, 
however the cost effectiveness of this will need to be investigated as well as the return of 
investment [48]. It is thought that it would be better to sell the underutilised spectrum 
directly to the secondary users as you make more revenue and it is better to keep the 
regulator involved as little as possible as this could cause delays [46]. However in the 
current scheme, the spectrum will need to be given back to ICASA as they are 
responsible to manage the assignments.  
 
The regulator [51] agrees fully that spectrum needs to be used more efficiently and 
believes that all bands can be used for spectrum trading as every band is underutilised 
dependent on geographical areas. Dense areas can be seen to have scarce spectrum. 
Spectrum trading is long overdue and current legislation does not prevent it except to the 
main telecommunications operators. Small players in the industry could be trading 
spectrum and the regulator would be unaware.  
 
The regulator [51] feels the best pricing model for the market is a cooperative scheme as 
with infrastructure sharing, the highest profit can be attained. Infrastructure sharing 
assists in minimising the costs associated with installing and maintaining new 
infrastructure. The regulator can be involved in enforcing a cooperative pricing model, 
however if they are involved, they cannot select who the spectrum is awarded too and the 
bids may appear unfair. The regulator [51] also agrees that spectrum should be given to 
secondary users for free as it distorts the economic model. With regards to the market for 
spectrum trading, if spectrum trading is used for backhaul, there may be an issue of who 
the primary user is and who the secondary user is and if spectrum trading is used for rural 
areas, who covers the costs.  
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology used in this work, the simulation results obtained 
and the findings on regulations and policy in South Africa. An economic duopoly game is 
presented showing the effects of the variation in offered price, channel quality, spectrum 
substitutability, bandwidth requirement of primary users and effect of the offered price on 
the primary service. The effect on the profit of each pricing strategy is identified and 
noted. The findings from the survey show the market is ready is ready for spectrum 
 87 
 
trading for a fee charged to the secondary users for the service and the best band currently 
is TVWS band as it will be freed up in the near future. The concluding chapter discusses 
the key findings, conclusions, recommendations and future work. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations  
6.1 Introduction 
In order to improve the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum, intelligent wireless 
communication systems such as cognitive radio technologies is utilized while 
accommodating the exponential growth in wireless services and applications. Enormous 
research challenges stand in the way of the implementation of cognitive networks. This 
research report provides theoretical and experimental solutions to one of such challenges, 
which are secondary user pricing strategies. 
 
Chapter 1 of this research reports provided a brief introduction into the subject of 
spectrum sharing for cognitive radio networks and discussed the motivation and problem 
definition behind on whether spectrum trading is viable in South Africa; and if it is, 
which spectrum band is it most suited for. An extension of this research is would the 
payoffs received from secondary user spectrum trading would be worth charging for or is 
it acceptable for it to be offered for free? The objectives of this research are discussed.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the cognitive radio environment, its components, cognitive radio 
applications and dynamic spectrum access. An introduction is given to game theory and 
economic theories in dynamic spectrum access, which presented a method to model the 
relationship and interactions among primary and secondary users competing for spectrum 
and pricing strategies to assign the price. An optimal and stable solution for spectrum 
trading in terms of price and allocated spectrum is imperative to maximise the revenue of 
the seller and utility of the buyer while still satisfying both the seller and buyer and their 
solutions.  
 
Chapter 3 extended the literature survey in Chapter Two to a review of specific 
application scenarios considered in some research papers from the perspective of 
contextual assessment of spectrum sharing, game theory and economic theory models 
applied in cognitive networks. The concluding section provides comparative approaches 
to telecommunication regulations with respect with spectrum trading and spectrum 
licensing in South Africa. 
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Chapter 4 presented the frameworks for two of the pricing strategies presented for 
cognitive radio networks in sufficient theoretical detail for a duopoly.  
 
Chapter 5 presented the methods used for simulation and an interview on policy and 
regulation and the results obtained thereof. Test cases were applied to visualise the effects 
under different constraints.  
6.2 Research Findings 
The analysis and simulation results presented in this research report give insights into the 
two pricing strategies, market-equilibrium and competitive pricing. The succeeding 
subsection outlines these in perspective. 
 
The solution of a market-equilibrium pricing strategy is market equilibrium, whereas for a 
competitive pricing strategy is Nash equilibrium. The primary services compete for 
revenue in a competitive pricing strategy and there is neither competition nor cooperation 
in a market-equilibrium strategy. The revenue attained in competitive pricing strategy is 
higher than that in a market-equilibrium strategy. The existence of a solution for both 
models is when the bandwidth requirement is neither too high nor too low. The spectrum 
substitutability can greatly influence the profit as if it is too high, users can move around 
the frequency spectrum bands freely changing depending on the offered price and if it is 
too low, users would not want to choose that service. This highlights the importance of 
the variables in the pricing strategies and shows the impact they have on the profit. From 
[31], it is seen that the cooperative model has the highest profit; however it is also the 
least stable for a distributed implementation (which is the most realistic) and market-
equilibrium pricing model has the lowest profit of the three models. One of the downfalls 
of a competitive pricing model is that there is decrease in profit when there are more 
primary services competing. The regulator feels a cooperative pricing model is the most 
desirable for a developing country. 
 
From the survey it is seen that the market would welcome sharing of underutilised white 
spaces in spectrum with secondary users provided it does not cause interference; however 
operators do not agree for it to be given to secondary users for free as this would distort 
their economic model as they pay very high rates for the spectrum licenses. The 
suggested bands for this service are the freed up spectrum after the digital migration, 700 
MHz and 800 MHz (TVWS) as well as the 2.6 GHz band. Therefore it can be said that 
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the best band for spectrum sharing is the TVWS band, however the regulator feels all the 
bands can be used for spectrum trading.  
 
The behaviour of the market if spectrum trading were allowed would be reflective on the 
market, as South Africa is not a mature market, the operators would act competitively to 
outdo the other operators and earn the most revenue based on the Competition Act. If 
operators cooperate with one another, jointly they can earn more revenue, however this is 
dependent on the market and the operators, it is believed that it is possible that the 
primary service providers would cooperate with the smaller role players, however the 
larger operators could try to eliminate the smaller role players from the market. From this, 
it can be seen that the best pricing strategy currently suited to primary services is the 
competitive pricing strategy where the primary services compete with each other to make 
a profit.  
 
The market considered proposed for spectrum trading could include provision of 
backhaul links, rural sectors and point to multipoint sites for access networks. In rural 
areas, this comes at high costs and operators feel these services to such areas can be 
offered as a premium service with reduced rates however not for free.  If spectrum trading 
is used for backhaul, there may be an issue of who the primary user is and who the 
secondary user is.  
 
6.3 Recommendations 
In wireless communication, cognitive radio technology is generally perceived as a 
disruptive technology, because of its ability to autonomously adapt to changing network 
conditions in order to ensure a more flexible and spectrally efficient wireless network. 
The flexibility of cognitive radio comes with the downfall of complicated spectrum 
management and hence pricing. 
 
In recent years, there have been many research studies that have investigated different 
methods for pricing and spectrum allocation. However, many are not from an economic 
and regulatory perspective. 
 
Based on the background analyses presented in this research report, the following 
recommendations can be made: 
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 It is recommended that distributed algorithms be used to allow the primary 
service to learn the behaviour of other entities from the history 
 It can also be recommended that a joint spectrum allocation and spectrum bidding 
model be proposed as it encompasses the cognitive radio environment as a whole 
 ICASA should consider a competitive pricing model for the interaction between 
primary services to determine the best price 
 ICASA need to undertake detailed market research on the benefits of providing 
secondary trading to the market, which market and the cost effectiveness to the 
operator 
 ICASA need to weigh up the pros and cons of the different auction models before 
deciding on a ‘beauty contest’ with a closed bid auction and the impact it has on 
secondary trading 
6.4 Future Work 
The idea behind distributed algorithms is a good place to start as in a practical cognitive 
radio environment; a primary service may not have the complete network information. 
Distributed algorithms allow the primary service to learn the behaviour of other entities 
from the history and a distributed price adjustment algorithm is required to reach the final 
solution. To achieve distributed algorithms, an information exchange protocol is required 
for signalling. It would be of interest to determine a stability analysis of each algorithm.  
 
Future work in allocation of spectrum and pricing models in joint spectrum bidding and 
pricing would be useful in the field, for e.g. using a double auction to assign spectrum and 
then a pricing strategy thereafter to charge for the spectrum.  
 
Open research issues in this field include, a spectrum trading model for a large number of 
users, spectrum pricing under time-varying demand and supply, a risk-return model of 
dynamic spectrum access and the proposed market for spectrum trading. 
 
From a regulation and policy view, it would be good to perform future work on which 
market spectrum trading can be used in as well as what level of service an operator would 
like to provide. The benefits of spectrum trading over other technologies such as the 
satellite band, fibre and 3G picocells need to be investigated.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this research report, solutions to the problem of secondary user pricing strategies in a 
cognitive radio environment have been approached from the perspective of game and 
economic theory. 
 
In terms of game theory, an attempt has been made to characterise the resolution of 
conflict among multiple cognitive radio users involved in selfish interaction. In terms of 
economic theory, an attempt has been made to characterise the conflict among primary 
services and the competition between them to maximise their revenue by selling spectrum 
to secondary users.  
 
Two strategies, the competitive pricing strategy and the market-equilibrium strategy, 
which have derived from economic theory and game theory jointly, have been introduced 
and represented in sufficient theoretical details. The results from the simulations are 
compared to the regulatory and policy views in South Africa.  
 
A survey of background technical details, a review of existing research works, 
comprehensive simulation and survey results have been presented. The simulation results 
presented indicate the competitive pricing strategy produces a higher profit the market-
equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing strategy describes the behaviour 
of primary service providers in South Africa provided regulations are imposed to allow 
spectrum trading. Until ICASA revise the frequency plan and decide on a method of 
assigning spectrum, spectrum trading is just a thought for the future.  
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Appendix A –List of Interviewees 
Table 1: List of Interviewees 
INSTITUTION  ORGANISATION  
Major Spectrum Licence Holders  Telkom SA  
Neotel  
Vodacom SA  
Cell C  
MTN  
Academia  University of Witwatersrand  
University of Namur 
Portfolio Organisations Ellipsis Regulatory Solutions 
Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa 
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Appendix B – Questionnaire 
1 December 2013 
Telephone: 082 615 9310 
 
Ref: Participation in Research Study 
Dear Participant................................. 
 
I Elicia Naidu, am a MSc in Electrical Engineering -Telecommunications student, at the 
University of Witwatersrand. I wish to conduct a survey on the regulatory side of 
“Secondary user pricing strategies in the cognitive radio environment”. My academic 
supervisor is Professor Rex Van Olst and my co-supervisor is Ms. Lucienne Abrahams.  
 
Strict measures will be taken in order to protect your anonymity and confidentiality to 
avoid any harm that may result as a result of your participation on this survey. Your 
participation in this study is voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw your 
participation at any stage of the research should you wish to do so. The benefits are that 
you will have the opportunity to share your experiences with your peer group. The 
research results may even be made available to you on request.  
 
Yours Sincerely  
E. Naidu 
 
Table 1: Interview Questions 
1. Opinion on spectrum trading concepts 
a. How do you feel about sharing underutilised white spaces in spectrum with 
secondary users? 
b. Would you be happy with partially degraded service for a profit 
c. How do you think the other operators would behave if spectrum trading were 
allowed? (Would they act competitively with each other or cooperate to attain 
the highest total profit by selling spectrum to the secondary service?) 
2. Is it possible that the primary service providers would ever be cooperative and 
collude to attain the highest total profit from selling spectrum to the secondary 
service or collude to provide the best service to the public sector and rural areas?   
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3. Reaction to secondary users piggybacked on primary service provider’s 
underutilised spectrum for free? 
4. Have you considered methods of assigning spectrum, e.g. auctioning of spectrum? If 
so, what are your views? 
5. If you had to allow spectrum trading, what markets would you propose this to in 
South Africa or where would you want this service to be used (for both cases where 
spectrum is traded for free and at a cost to secondary users) 
6. What type of footprint/impact would primary service providers like to have on the 
South African Economy?  
a. Would you as an operator like to better the economy by providing free access to 
public sectors or rural areas where access is poor or would you prefer to offer it 
a paid for service to those who can afford it? 
b. If you had to price this service, would you offer it as a premium service or with 
reduced rates? 
7. What spectrum band do you feel would be the best suited for spectrum trading?  
8. Have you considered pricing strategies as a primary service provider? If so, what 
have you considered? 
9. Would you as a primary service provider buy back underutilised spectrum if you 
had that opportunity? 
10. Would you prefer to sell the underutilised spectrum directly to secondary users or 
would it be better to sell it back to the regulator (ICASA)? 
 
